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DIVERSITY THEORY OF CHARITABLE EXEMPTION
INTRODUCTION
What is the normative rationale for the federal income tax exemption for
nonprofit charitable corporations? Even though the exemption dates back to
1894,' Congress has failed to fully rationalize it.' Though scholars and courts
have attempted over the years to come up with a coherent rationale for the
charitable tax exemption, their attempts are focused almost exclusively on
economic efficiency. Thus, the charitable tax exemption is typically framed
by noted tax scholars like Boris Bittker, Henry Hansmann, and others as an
economically efficient means of providing certain goods and services to the
public.' Rationalizing the charitable tax exemption in economic terms is
certainly appealing and deceptively comforting. Indeed, since taxation is
facially concerned with money, why not articulate a basis for tax exemption
in money terms-hence, economic efficiency.
But no matter how appealing efficiency might seem, it is axiomatic that
law, and more particularly tax law, is about much more than economic
efficiency. Tax law is about broader conceptions of justice, fairness, and
other aspects of a democratic society that extend beyond economic principles.'
1. See Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556; see also Revenue Act of 1909, ch.
6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
2. See Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom Federal
Income Tax, 85 YALE L.J. 299,301-04 (1976) (concluding that the "legislative history of the tax exemption
reveals no systematic analysis").
3. Most notable of the economic theorists is Henry Hansmann in his capital subsidy theory. See
Henry Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom CorporateIncome Taxation,
91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981). Other such theorists include Boris Bittker, Mark Hall, and John Colombo. See
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2; Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit
Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 (199 1) [hereinafter Hall
&Colombo, CharitableStatus]; Mark A. Hall& John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable
Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo, Donative Theory].
Hansmann's theory of exemption is particularly noteworthy because he positions his theory as an explicitly
economic rationalization for the charitable tax exemption that accounts for the bulk of so-called "public
goods" provided by charities. However, even Hansmann's broadly accepted economic theory of the
charitable tax exemption has been challenged, principally on non-economic grounds. See, e.g., Rob
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990) [hereinafter Atkinson,
Altruism]; Rob Atkinson, Theories of the FederalIncome Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis,
and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997) [hereinafter Atkinson, Theories]; Nina J. Crimm, An
Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk
Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing
the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998).
4. For example, even though the federal estate tax burden is born almost exclusively by wealthy
taxpayers, its temporary repeal has been promoted politically as, alternatively, an end to the death tax and
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Likewise, the tax exemption for charities is about much more than money,
economics, or optimal profit. Instead, the charitable tax exemption is
principally about accomplishing a value-based mission. That mission may at
times be at odds with the notion of a pure profit motive that dominates the
private market narrative.5 While efficiency analysis may be relevant to some
aspects of a charitable mission, there are many other non-economic aspects of
"mission" that extend beyond economics. Thus, this article does not dispute
that traditional efficiency analysis adds to our normative understanding of tax-
exempt charity law. Economic analysis may, for example, aid in
understanding the exemption's economic impact. However, efficiency alone
simply does not fully explain the varied and rich non-economic aspects of the
charitable tax exemption. Accordingly, this article offers an alternative
framing of the charitable tax exemption that serves as an alternative to the
longstanding economic theories of scholars like Boris Bittker, Henry
Hansmann, and others. The article demonstrates that a principal normative
justification for the exemption, in addition to economic efficiency, is
diversity-what this article calls "contextual diversity."
Part I of the article presents Robin Paul Malloy's Law and Market
Economy Theory ("LMT") as an example of the basis for a normative
explanation of the charitable tax exemption. LMT addresses the relationship
among law, markets, and culture. Thus, using LMT, this part demonstrates
how traditional law and economic analysis, premised on self-interest and
wealth maximization, simply does not capture the essence of the many values
that impact the marketplace and the market exchange process. Instead, LMT
an end to a tax on small family farms. See, e.g., Sarah E. Waldeck, An Appeal to Charity: Using
Philanthropy to Revitalize the Estate Tax, 24 VA. TAX REV. 667,695-96 (2005) (referring to the estate tax
as the "death tax" and noting that aside from its aim of preventing high concentrations of wealth, the estate
tax has many emotional components); see also David A. Brennen, Race and Equality Across the Law
School Curriculum: The Law of Tax Exemption, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336 (2004) (explaining how
incorporation of concepts of race into legal disciplines such as tax law might enrich study of these areas).
5. In emphasizing the distinctive characteristics of non-profits, including tax-exempt charities,
from for-profit organizations, Professor Robin Paul Malloy has explained:
One can reasonably ask why it is that we provide special local, state, and Federal tax benefits to
non-profits as opposed to private or for-profit organizations. .. . [M]any people believe it is
important to do so because non-profits tend to supply public goods, the provision of which is
usually under-provided in the private market. Furthermore, non-profits generally seek to promote
values that are difficult to measure in economic terms. The non-profit framework, therefore, raises
some important cultural-interpretive issues. The focus on values, and the rejection of a pure profit
motive, are two very important points of divergence from the conventionalized norms expressed in
our private market narratives.
ROB IN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL
REASONING 214 (2004) (emphasis in original).
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approaches legal analysis in a broader market context and is premised on the
need to promote a process of sustainable wealth formation as opposed to
maximizing wealth. As an illustration of the difference between traditional
law and economics and LMT, Part I addresses the way in which LMT is
compatible with Critical Race Theory in discerning normative rationales for
law that enable richer reflections ofjustice, fairness, and equality that are not
necessarily connected to positive economics or efficiency.
Part II of the article presents a theory of the charitable tax exemption that
is line with LMT and based on the value of diversity. "Contextual diversity,"
as explained herein, references alternative understandings of LMT to build on
insights of traditional economic analysis and present an alternative value-
based rationalization for the charitable tax exemption. Part II concludes by
explaining that using contextual diversity as a principal value-based
rationalization for the charitable tax exemption not only captures the essence
of the exemption, but it also provides direction for potentially reforming and
re-inventing various aspects of tax-exempt charity law.
Part III of the article provides a detailed outline of the charitable tax
exemption-explaining both the affirmative and negative aspects of the
exemption. The purpose of this detailed outline is to position the exemption
as not simply a financial "free pass" on the obligation to pay income tax.
Rather, the charitable tax exemption is the gateway to an alternative way of
operating an enterprise, with many burdens and benefits flowing therefrom
that often have nothing to do with economics or efficiency. Instead, these
non-economic aspects of the charitable tax exemption often concern the many
non-economic aspects of justice, fairness, equality, political authority, and
other basic normative principles. Tax-exempt charities are not like private
for-profit firms that measure success by bottom-line profits; nor are they like
public entities that measure success by voter support or re-election. Tax-
exempt charities measure success by how well their missions are
accomplished. Measuring success in this way is inherently "more of a
normative judgment than it is for a private entity" or a public entity "because
there are fewer external market indicators available" for determining a
charity's success.6
Part IV builds on Part I by demonstrating how the predominant traditional
theories of charitable tax exemptionjust do not capture the full essence of the
normative aspects of the exemption. Part IV analyzes the traditional theories
promulgated prior to 1990 which rely principally on economic efficiency as
6. Id. at 219-20.
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a guidepost for discerning an appropriate rationale. While these traditional
theories have a sexy "law and economics" appeal, the article demonstrates
how they fail to fully explain many non-economic aspects of the charitable tax
exemption.7 Finally, Part V briefly identifies some of the implications of
contextual diversity theory on the structure of tax-exempt charity law.
I. INTERSECTIONS OF ECONOMIC AND CRITICAL THEORIES OF LAW
LMT and its interplay with Critical Race Theory (CRT) is just one
example of how different theoretical approaches to law can come together to
partially expose important elements of a particular substantive area of law.
Sub-part A outlines LMT-a theory of law that is based on economic
principles, but which extends beyond traditional economic analysis to
incorporate other humanistic values into an understanding of law and social
interaction. LMT posits that law is more fully understood when economic
analysis is combined with other approaches to legal analysis to demonstrate
the dynamic and ever-changing aspects of human interaction. As one example
of how other theories of law might complement economic understandings of
the law, sub-part B demonstrates how CRT might be used as a means of
understanding aspects of law that are not fully understood by economics
alone. Overall, this section demonstrates how traditional understandings
about economic analysis of law could be diversified by accommodating other
approaches to law, such as CRT. Such accommodation could lead to better,
more diverse understandings of the structure of tax-exempt charity law and
potentially improve future development of this burgeoning area of law.
7. This Article focuses primarily on the pre- 1990 theories of charitable tax exemption because they
tend to rely almost exclusively on notions of economic efficiency. In future research, I intend to examine
theories promulgated since 1990 that challenge the pre-1990 traditional theories. These more recent
theories of exemption challenge the traditional theories by focusing less on economic efficiency and more
on non-economic values. They draw on notions of philosophy, political theory, and moral values as a
means for complementing the traditional economics focus of the pre-1990 theories. Thus, these recent
theories explain the charitable tax exemption from the perspective of the selflessness (as opposed to self-
interest) of the donor, see, e.g., Atkinson, Altruism, supra note 3; Atkinson, Theories, supra note 3, and
the alternate political authority offered by the charitable form, see, e.g., Brody, supra note 3. These other
theories of the charitable tax exemption come closer to articulating the type of contextual diversity
contemplated in this article. For they implicitly recognize that much of the justification for the charitable
tax exemption is not about economic efficiency. Many aspects of the exemption concern notions ofjustice,
fairness, and opportunity-concepts that are not necessarily translatable into economic or efficiency
terminology. However, I intend to develop, in later research, the idea that even these theories do not fully
account for the many complexities inherent in the charitable tax exemption.
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A. Law and Market Theory-Sustainable Wealth
Traditional economic analysis of law is premised on the idea that
efficiency leads to wealth maximization. Richard Posner, in his book
Economic Analysis of Law, writes that: "economics is the science of rational
choice in a world ... in which resources are limited in relation to human
wants."' This means that, given the scarcity of resources that people desire,
economic analysis attempts to predict how best to allocate these resources. If
these resources will be allocated best without legal intervention, then law and
economics would suggest that no law be created. On the other hand, if law is
needed to ensure proper resource allocation, law and economics would so
indicate. Thus, according to Posner, law and economics has both positive and
normative aspects.' On the positive side, economic analysis can be used to
describe legal rules and results that form the foundation of common law.
Normatively, economic analysis asserts that law makers and judges should opt
for legal rules that advance efficient allocation of legal resources. The job of
economics, then, is to examine the results of assuming that humans are
rational maximizers and, hence, naturally pursuers of self-interest. Economic
analysis suggests that in pursuing self-interest, individuals will necessarily
advance the public interest. Thus, the goal of economics is efficiency, or in
other words, the allocation of resources in such a way as to maximize value-
where value is how much someone is willing to pay for something."
For a number ofreasons, economic analysis is an inappropriate means, by
itself, for making decisions about the proper structure of law. Indeed, law is
about social interaction. Thus, law is necessarily about justice, fairness,
equality, and other aspects of social existence. Economic analysis often fails
to capture all of these aspects of law. The primary reason for this failure of
economic analysis is its attempt to make purely scientific that which cannot
be explained by science alone. That is, law and economics as an approach to
legal decision-making seeks to make law appear more, rather than less,
scientific." Thus, traditional law and economics avoids resort to humanities
and other disciplines that provide alternative explanations of human
interaction and social constructs. This is not to say that economic analysis is
not useful for legal reasoning and decision-making. To the contrary,
8. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003).
9. Id. at 3-16.
10. Id.
11. Robin Paul Malloy, Framing the Market: Representations of Meaning and Value in Law,
Markets, and Culture, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 17 (2003).
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economic analysis has a definite role to play, but that role must accommodate
for the many other aspects of human existence aside from those that are
amenable to precise scientific understanding.
Specifically, one of the major failings of traditional economic analysis is
the absence of accounting for decision-making that is not "rational" in an
economic sense, but yet, is fully justifiable on other grounds. People are not
always motivated to act by self-interest alone. 2 Indeed, people often act for
purely non-selfish reasons-such as out of concern for the well-being of
others, out of habit, in response to tradition, or out of regard for their
subordination to the power of others. These various reasons for human action
require reference to more than economics to be properly understood. Thus,
to structure laws based primarily on the sole assumption of people as self-
interested actors would not necessarily respond to real societal needs.
Charities operate, not out of private self-interest, but instead out of a public
benefit, or mission, interest. This is distinct from for-profit corporations,
which operate so as to maximize economic profits. Therefore, attempts to
articulate a rationale for the charitable tax exemption by resort to economic
analysis alone necessarily miss this important distinguishing aspect of
charitable operations.
In his "law and market economy" theory, Professor Robin Paul Malloy
echoes a similar theme as that advanced by Nobel prize winning economist
Amartya Sen in explaining that efficiency and wealth maximization are
inadequate measures for assessing social well-being. 3 Malloy explains the
market as a place of meaning and value formation in which real value emerges
from the continuous process of exchange and interaction. He argues that the
process of sustainable wealth formation is difficult to measure and understand
in traditional efficiency terms. He demonstrates that the process of
sustainable wealth formation relies on creativity, and on the dynamic nature
12. This finding, that people are not always motivated by self-interest, is consistent with ideas
espoused by scholars who advance the idea of behavioral law and economics as an evolved notion of
traditional law and economics. See, e.g., CASS R. SuNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 8 (2000).
Professor Sunstein explains:
Economists sometimes assume that people are self-interested, in the sense that they are focused on
their own welfare rather than that of others, and in the sense that material welfare is what most
concerns them. This is sometimes true, and often it is a useful simplifying assumption. Butpeople
also may want to be treated fairly and to act fairly, and, perhaps even more important, they want
to be seen to act fairly, especially but not only among nonstrangers. For purposes of understanding
law, what is especially important is that people may sacrifice their economic self-interest in order
to be, or to appear, fair.
Id. (emphasis added).
13. See MALLOY, supra note 5, at 50-52.
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of inclusive, diverse, and extensive networks and patterns of exchange. 4
Value emerges from the dynamic interaction and play between people and
their ideas. And, wealth formation is facilitated by connecting diverse
individuals and communities so that valuable information fragments and
experiences enter into the broader marketplace.15 Discrimination, exclusion,
and inaccessibility hinder the sustainability of the wealth formation process.
In this regard, Malloy challenges three fundamental aspects of traditional
law and economics concerning the primary tension in law and economics, the
primary means of wealth formation in the market, and the nature of market
choice. 6 First, Malloy explains that the primary tension in LMT is between
the concepts of efficiency and creativity, not between efficiency and social
responsibility as alleged by traditional law and economics. He says that there
is no need to understand the counterpart of social responsibility as efficiency
because a properly functioning market incorporates an ethic of social
responsibility. According to Malloy, efficiency, in law and economic terms,
is grounded in the static notions of habit, convention, and continuity.
Efficiency is reactive and is grounded in making the most of current
understandings of the market. Creativity, on the other hand, is much more
dynamic. According to Malloy, creativity is grounded in notions of
potentiality, discontinuity, and indeterminacy. Thus, creativity is necessarily
proactive and ever-evolving. 7
Second, drawing on the tension between efficiency and creativity, Malloy
argues that creativity in the market is the primary means of wealth formation,
not efficiency. While efficiencyis certainly relevant and has an important role
to play in market theory, efficiency just cannot account for the process of
creativity." Efficiency requires ideal environments based on habit-informed
14. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 106-35 (2000).
15. See id. at 124.
16. Id. at 2-4. More specifically, law and economics alleges that the primary tension in the market
is between efficiency and social responsibility; that efficiency is the primary means of wealth formation in
the market; and that market choice is rational, objective, and the scientific result of cost and benefit
analysis.
17. Id. at 3.
18. This aspect of Malloy's theory (highlighting the importance of creativity in the market) is
reminiscent of the idea of "creative destruction" which was first introduced in 1942 by the Austrian
Economist Joseph Schumpeter. "Creative destruction... describes the process of industrial transformation
that accompanies radical innovation. In Schumpeter's vision of capitalism, innovative entry by
entrepreneurs was the force that sustained long-term economic growth, even as it destroyed the value of
established companies that enjoyed some degree of monopoly power." See Wikipedia, Creative
Destruction, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative-destruction (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
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conventions and pre-established relational choices. Creativity, on the other
hand, relies on habit-deforming and transforming exchange relationships that
permit the discovery of something new and different. 9 Creativity is by nature
indeterminate, habit-breaking, and convention-challenging. Since it cannot be
observed directly, creativity can only be examined by looking at the contextual
communities which foster it. As Professor Malloy explains: "One must
identify the types of communities which, by ethics and social values, tend to
foster diversity, experimentation, and unconventional networks and patterns
of exchange." ' These are communities that embrace inclusion and diversity,
and are ones that think about the market process in terms that are broader than
economic efficiency.
Third, Malloy explains that market choice involves a process of
interpretation-it is not a rational or objective fact which can be determined
scientifically by cost and benefit analysis, unimpacted by social influences.
Rather, market choice is the result of one's interpretation of market incentives
and disincentives as informed by personal experiences rather than by abstract
notions of objectivity and rationality.2 A person's cultural biases, whether
relating to race, sex, or sexual orientation, for example, have a decided impact
on how he/she defines, interprets, and weighs the costs and benefits of a
particular action. This distinction between rational choice and interpretation
is a key aspect of Professor Malloy's divergence from traditional law and
economics. As Professor Malloy explains:
This distinction is important because the process of interpretation is community based,
and because it indicates that even though exchange takes place as a continuous part of
a dynamic system, our understanding of the exchange process is shaped by the
interpretive "lens" or "screen" through which we view it. Furthermore, this lens or
screen, as an indexical reference in semiotics, is grounded in a system ofvalues informed
by experience rather than by purely objective and rational choice.22
In essence, the reliance in law and economics on methodological
individualism is flawed because it extracts the individual from the cultural-
interpretive community in which she is embedded. At the same time it
disconnects the individual from history and context, thus ignoring the
19. MALLOY, supra note 14, at 78-90.
20. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 3-4.
22. Id. at 4.
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interplay between an individual's experiences and her cultural-interpretive
framework for understanding.2 3
B. Critical Race Theory
Instead of simply relying on economic principles to articulate a coherent
rationale for the charitable tax exemption, traditional law and economic
analysis should (and could)-as urged by LMT-be combined with other
legal approaches to law in order to add an additional screen or lens through
which to rationalize charitable tax exemption law. One example of a legal
approach to law that might provide an additional lens, in addition to economic
analysis, through which to filter and understand the charitable tax exemption
is CRT.
CRT developed in the latter part of the twentieth century as a response by
progressive scholars of color to critical legal studies, which in turn was a
response to Legal Realism. 4 Legal Realists criticized the rule of law as overly
formalistic and promoting, under the guise of neutrality and objectivity, a
system of laws actually driven by policy, economics, and politics. 5 These
revelations ultimately lead Realists to pronounce the law as indeterminate by
nature. Critical legal scholars took the Realists' agenda a step further by
deconstructing and delegitimizing the law--describing it as not only political,
but also ideological and hegemonic."6 As time passed, some scholars of color
became disenchanted with critical legal studies because of its failure to
acknowledge White supremacy and otherwise meaningfully critique racial
power and racial hegemony." These progressive scholars of color developed
their own race-conscious approach to legal analysis, seeking to expose the
legal and social construction of race itself with the goal of eradicating racial
subordination.28
23. See id. at 60-61. One way of understanding this interpretation issue is to think of the movie
"Shallow Hal." Shallow Hal (Fox 2001). In the movie, the lead female character is a large overweight
woman. However, one of the male characters who falls in love with her sees her as a thin and beautiful
young woman. Despite the fact that everyone else sees the woman as overweight and unattractive, this male
character does not see her that way at all-he interprets what he sees when he looks at her as a vision of
loveliness.
24. Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the
Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1025, 1051, 1054-58 (2003).
25. Id. at 1055.
26. Id. at 1055-56.
27. Id. at 1057.
28. See id. at 1057-58.
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CRT is characterized primarily by its opposition to three mainstream
beliefs about racism: 1) that color-blindness will eliminate racism; 2) that
racism is an individual act, not a systemic problem; and 3) that problems of
racism can be addressed without dealing with other forms of societal injustice
such as sexism, homophobia, or economic exploitation.29 One of the central
concepts in CRT is that race is a social construct-an idea. In other words,
the concept of race occurs, not naturally, but by invention in society.
Understanding race as a social construct helps to explain both racial existence
and racial hierarchy.3" Another important concept in CRT is its rejection of
racial essentialism. Essentialismrefers to the assumption that a particular race
has a certain essence. CRT rejects this essentialist approach to race. Instead,
for CRT, race is contextual. As Kimberle Crenshaw has explained, CRT is
committed to the idea that racial identities are intersectional and that racial
minorities' vulnerability to discrimination is a function of specific
intersectional identities."'
C. The Relatedness of Law and Market Economy and Critical Race Theory
Malloy's law and market economy theory shares many attributes with
CRT on the subject of challenging traditional law and economic analysis.3
Both law and market economy theory and CRT reject the primacy of
efficiency as espoused in traditional economic analysis.33 Professor Malloy's
challenge to efficiency is from a market perspective, while critical race
theorists challenge efficiency from an equality perspective. 4 Professor
Malloy explains that creativity, not efficiency, is the primary means of wealth
creation in the market. Similarly, critical legal scholars explain that racism
is not just a problem of individual choice, but instead is the result of a
systematic condition of racial subordination. Thus, both law and market
economy theory and CRT reject the notion that the focus of proper legal
structure should be on the calculus of individual choice. Instead, the focus
should be on the diversity of societal structures that create the circumstances
leading to the choice.
29. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE
L.J. 1757, 1766-67 (2003) (reviewing FRANCISCO VALDEZ ET AL., CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)).
30. See id. at 1769-71.
31. See id. at 1774-75.
32. See Houh, supra note 24, at 1063-66.
33. Id. at 1063.
34. Id.
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According to Malloy, market analysis is primarily concerned with the
human practice of exchange-about who initiates exchange, who is excluded
from exchange, what is subject to exchange, and on what terms exchange
occurs." Furthermore, he argues that it is important to examine the way in
which people experience the market exchange process-noting "that
experience varies by a number of characteristics [such as] race, gender, age,
and education level, among others."36 These contextual and experienced-
based considerations of the market are consistent with similar considerations
and values expressed in CRT.37
In addition to challenging traditional law and economics as focused too
much on efficiency, law and market economy theory and CRT both
acknowledge the overt political nature of market actors-affirmatively
acknowledging the societal/contextual influences on law makers, judges, and
those subject to law.3" Traditional law and economics attempts to conceal
many of these contextual influences by projecting an air of neutrality or
objectivity through use of the science of economics. However, Professor
Malloy unmasks this charade by explaining how law and economics scholars
misunderstand both the impact of racial subordination on market exchange
processes and the indeterminate nature of the market exchange process.39
Despite the similarities between CRT and traditional law and economics
theory with regard to both being politicized--one overtly so and the other not
so overtly-many still view law and economics as more objective than CRT.
Nevertheless, it is clear that CRT has a role to play in understanding law in a
social context.
More specifically, because critical race theorists offer a view of social
context that is just as legitimate as that offered by traditional law and
economics, it seems perfectly reasonable to examine the charitable tax
exemption through the dual lenses of CRT and traditional law and economic
analysis. Though tax laws by nature appear readily amenable to economic
analysis, this conclusion fails to take account of the uniqueness of tax laws
concerning charities. Unlike many tax laws that deal with raising government
revenue, tax laws imposed on charities do not have this overt revenue-raising
goal. Instead, the overarching goal of tax laws imposed on charities is to
enhance the mission ofcharities. In fact, it is only when a charity diverts from
35. See MALLOY, supra note 5, at 1-25; MALLOY, supra note 14, at 57-69.
36. See MALLOY, supra note 5, at 1.
37. See, for example, id. at 6, as an example of these connections.




its mission that its tax exemption is jeopardized. 4' As one examines the
complex nature of the charitable tax exemption, one must ask: "Why are
charitable corporations not required to pay income taxes?" The exemption has
traditionally been rationalized on efficiency grounds. However, efficiency
cannot be used to rationalize all aspects of the charitable tax exemption. What
about the other conceptions ofjustice and fairness that are not reflected in the
calculus of economic efficiency? Thus, LMT offers an analytical approach
to the charitable tax exemption that helps us to better rationalize it.
In support of this proposition--that LMT permits a better rationalization
of the charitable tax exemption, the remaining parts of this article do four
things. First, Part 11 proposes a new theory of the charitable tax exemption
premised on LMT concepts. Second, Part III explains various aspects of the
charitable tax exemption from the perspective of this new theory. Third, Part
IV compares and contrasts this new theory with many of the pre- 1990 theories
of the charitable tax exemption that are based almost exclusively on principles
of traditional economic efficiency. Finally, Part V briefly identifies some of
the implications of this new theory on the structure of tax exempt charity law.
II. A DIVERSrrY THEORY OF CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION
A. Diversity as a Value
Diversity has long been recognized as globally beneficial. In nature, for
example, diversity is seen as a key component for plant and animal species
survival. In financial investments, diversity is seen as the principal means of
reducing risk of capital loss and ensuring sustainable growth over the long
run. Importantly, in education, society values diversity as imperative if one
is to have a quality and well-rounded educational experience."' This article
40. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (litigation involving
Branch Ministries' tax-exempt status instigated by Branch Ministries' ad in a national newspaper against
Bill Clinton); Kelly Brewington, NAACP Retains Tax Exemption Despite Bond's Speech, IRS Says, BALT.
SUN, Sept. 1, 2006, at Al (discussing the IRS's challenge to NAACP's tax-exempt status because of its
leader's speech against president Bush); Benjamin Weiser, An Empire on Exemptions?: Televangelist Pat
Robertson Gained Fortune, and Critics, In Sale of His Cable Network, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1994, at HI
(discussing controversy over appropriateness of revoking CBN's tax-exempt status given its commercially
successful broadcast network).
41. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,343(2003) (upholding the UniversityofMichigan
Law School's affirmative action plan as consistent withthe equal protection clause); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (invalidating the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
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asserts that diversity is also the driving force behind the charitable tax
exemption. The diversity made possible by the charitable tax exemption
breeds creativity, ingenuity, and other things that stimulate society and, in
turn, market growth and development. The charitable tax exemption
contributes to diversity by offering alternative means of accomplishing
societal objectives in a market context. Thus, charities offer alternatives to
for-profit corporations and to government.42
Charities are just one of the many types of corporate entities that operate
in the United States. A key distinction between nonprofit charitable
corporations and for-profit corporations is the lack of shareholders in the
former. This means that while for-profit corporations are generally presumed
to be profit-motivated institutions, nonprofit charities carry no such
presumption. Instead, nonprofit charities are mission-driven and are legally
prohibited by the nondistribution constraint from extracting profits from the
corporation for private or personal gain.43 Thus, nonprofit charities provide
a viable alternative to the for-profit way of running a corporation-mission
focused as opposed to profit focused. This alternative corporate structure-
indeed, this diversity in corporate structure-in turn, contributes to the
possibility and actuality of diversity in output. For example, this diversity in
corporate structure means that we have for-profit corporations performing
research concerning potentially very profitable drugs for treatment ofHIV and
AIDS, while nonprofit charitable corporations search for a far less profitable
vaccine for this same disease." Imposing a tax on income incidentally earned
from these mission-driven activities would only serve to slow accomplishment
of the mission.4"
In addition to being an alternative to the corporate form of organization,
charities also offer an alternative to government.46 Like nonprofit charities,
42. Professor Jill Horwitz has reached similar conclusions regarding the value to society of the
alternative forms of hospitals, including for-profit, not-for-profit, and government hospitals. See Jill R.
Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit
Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1345 passim (2003).
43. See infra Part III.
44. See Jerry Avorn Discusses This Year's Flu Vaccine Shortage, All Things Considered (NPR
radio broadcast Oct. 6, 2004) (describing nonprofit efforts to develop an AIDS vaccine as compared to for-
profit efforts to seek potentially more financially profitable drugs for treatment of AIDS).
45. This is one way in which efficiencyanalysis as a normative principle works in conjunction with
other conceptions ofjusticeto help explain the charitable tax exemption. As more fully developed in Part
IV, this article embraces the idea that an income tax on charity income would "cut retained earnings...
and hence would further cripple a group of organizations already capital-constrained." Hansmann, supra
note 3, at 74.
46. See Brody, supra note 3, at 586.
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government does not have shareholders and is mission-driven. However, one
key difference between government and all corporations-both for-profit and
nonprofit-is government's ability to impose a tax (through law) as a means
of financing the production of its goods and services. The government's
ability to raise capital through taxation does not mean that government has an
endless supply of money, nor does it mean that government can do whatever
it wishes to do with this money. Indeed, a key limitation of government
activity is the requirement to obtain political support. This means that, unless
the public at large is willing to support the acquisition of particular goods or
services with direct outlay of tax monies, those goods or services will not be
acquired by government and, hence, will not be supplied to the public by
government. Accordingly, to the extent that provision of a particular good or
service has some support amongst citizens, yet lacks sufficient political
support to garner government backing, it will be up to nonprofit charities to
supply the good or service-financing that supply with either tax-exempt
profits or tax deductible donations.
B. Diversity in Context
Diversity as a value, however, need not be thought of as an unprincipled
process approach to law that is lacking in limits or principle. Diversity as a
value should be considered in context. Here, "context" refers to that aspect
of law that requires consideration of multiple points of interest-both public
interests and private interests. 7 For example, diversity as a value does not
mean that charities should be able to advance any conceivable private
purpose.4" Thus, tax-exempt charities, because of the public policy doctrine,
cannot engage in invidious racial discrimination against black people. Simply
recognizing that racial preferences promote diversity is not enough. LMT
teaches us that law must also account for racial preferences in various contexts
and from various perspectives-that is, law must contextually mediate public
societal interests and private societal interests regarding racial preferences.49
For instance, a critical race perspective of law would indicate that there is a
qualitative and meaningful difference between socially beneficial race-based
affirmative action (equalizing opportunities) and the societal harm advanced
by racial discrimination (continued racial subordination). Thus, contextual
47. See MALLOY, supra note 14, at 115.
48. See infra Part III.C.
49. See supra Part LB.
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diversity would suggest that even though racial preference in the context of
racial subordination is not permissible in tax-exempt charity law,5" racial
preference in the context of affirmative action may be permissible.5'
"Context" also explains other aspects of charitable tax exemption law
which limit private profit taking and private benefit,52 lobbying and political
campaigning," competitive business functions,54 and private endowments."
Granted, each of these limitations imposed on charities-including the public
policy limitation-appears to impinge on what a charity may do and, thus,
seems to hamper certain types of diversity. One must bear in mind, however,
that the aim of the charitable tax exemption is to allow for activities that
benefit public interests, not private ones. Thus, as explained in this article, the
various limitations imposed on charitable activity are all aimed, in one way or
another, at contending with the individual human tendency to seek out
authoritative influence to advance private objectives. 6 In other words, the
purpose of these limitations is to mediate between the private individual
tendency for authoritative control and the public interests advanced by the
charitable entity. Thus, the diversity value advocated in this article is not
50. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
51. See David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: RacialDiscrimination, Public Policy, and
"Charity" in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 396 (2000). Justice Stephen Breyer
recently echoed this idea that the same factual situation of racial preference can be viewed in two different
ways under the law. In Breyer's view, racial preference in the context of affirmative action is not only
constitutional, but also consistent with basic denocratic principles:
TOTENBERG: On the question of affirmative action in college admissions, Breyer defends the
practice as an effort to include all segments of a population in higher education or, as one opinion
in the majority put it, "The court should read the 14th Amendment guarantee to equal protection
of the law in light of its purpose, to take people who had once been slaves and make them full
members of society." That view prevailed in the Supreme Court by a 5-to-4 vote, but the dissenters
argued that the 14th Amendment was intended to create a color-blind society that would judge
people on merit, not skin color.
Justice BREYER: Both of those theories, as a matter of pure logic, are good. So in a situation
where an interpretation is so close, I think it's useful to turn back to the basic function of the
Constitution; that's where I think the democratic purpose had a role. Members of the armed forces,
members of the business community, members ofthe university community said, "We need at least
a limited degree of affirmative action in order to create a society where people will feel they belong
to our institution."
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer on "Active Liberty, "All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast
Sept. 29, 2005).
52. See infra Part lI.C.2.b.
53. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
54. See infra Part III.D.
55. See infra Part III.E.
56. Malloy, supra note 11, passim.
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unbridled diversity; rather, it is "contextual diversity" in the sense that the
scope of permissible charitable activity is not without limits.
In addition to understanding that diversity as a value is not unlimited in
scope, one must also appreciate the fact that the theory espoused in this article
is just that-a theory of the charitable tax exemption. Like all theories, it is
not perfect and is not intended to necessarily reflect every aspect of the
charitable tax exemption. Indeed,just as economic analysis admittedly does
not explain all that bears on the marketplace, the contextual diversity theory
outlined in this article does not profess to explain every aspect of the
charitable tax exemption. However, what contextual diversity does do is
explain many aspects of the charitable tax exemption that are not explained,
nor are explainable, by traditional economic theories. Contextual diversity
also complements, and in many cases extends, more modem theories of the
charitable tax exemption, such as Rob Atkinson's altruism theory and Evelyn
Brody's sovereignty theory. Thus, just as the altruism and the sovereignty
theories were not intended to replace Bittker and Rahdert's base-defining
theory or Hansmann's capital formation theory, neither is contextual diversity
intended to replace altruism, sovereignty, or any economic theory ofcharitable
tax exemption.
In the end, contextual diversity offers a normative rationalization of the
charitable tax exemption that can assist-in conjunction with economic
analysis-in better outlining the contours of charitable exemption law.
Consider again the example of tax-exempt law's public policy doctrine and its
limitation of charitable activity to activity that is not inconsistent with
established public policy. Established public policy is often conceived of in
application as federal governmental policy57 or majoritarian compliance.5"
Contextual diversity would suggest that the adoption of the public policy
doctrine was inappropriate in the sense that it was overkill. Indeed,
"established public policy"--whatever it means--does not define the bounds
of charity. Instead, LMT suggests that the scope of charitable activity is
varied, diverse, dynamic, and transformative. 9 Charitable activity may be
57. See Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 397
(2005).
58. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 606-12 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
59. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 11, at 103.
[P]eople positioned in alternative interpretive communities use different interpretive frames and
referaces. Thus, different people understand the world in different and sometimes conflicting
ways. Therefore, we must be aware of a variety of cultural-interpretive perspectives as they
influence the direction oflaw and socialpolicy. Consequently, we must understand the relationship
between law, markets and culture, and we must realize that by shifting interpretive perspectives we
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consistent with, have nothing to do with, or, most importantly, be completely
contrary to "established public policy" as presently conceived.6 °
A Piercian semiotic interpretation of the legal idea (or, semiotically
speaking, sign) "charitable" illustrates that its meaning has variance across
cultural-interpretive communities. In this regard the designation ofan activity
as "charitable" can be understood as an interpretation of, and a representation
of, particular underlying values.6' In some contexts, for example, "charitable"
stands as a representation for fulfilling a public purpose with respect to others
who are truly in need, with no pejorative connotation. In other contexts the
term "charitable" denotes action taken in support of subordinated people and
functions as a sign of one's nobility in dealing with lesser or inferior beings.
As a sign of public policy, "charitable" activities may take on multiple
nuanced meanings and may function, depending upon the context, as an
interpretation of underlying socio-legal values supporting invidious racial
discrimination. We cannot determine the appropriate contextual meaning of
"charitable" by reference only to positive economics and its emphasis on
efficiency analysis. We need a more textured and nuanced approach to
exchange relationships in a market context.
For example, understanding the problems of permissible and
impermissible racial preferences must be informed by the contextual
positioning of the parties involved. Markets are not fully objective and neutral
avenues of exchange; they are the product of human practice and culturally
informed values. Thus, when faced with the issue of the permissibility of
invidious racial discrimination by tax-exempt charities, a careful consideration
of the context of this type of racial preference reveals that mere racial
preference was not the problem in Bob Jones University v. United States. The
problem, as Critical Race Theory teaches us, was a problem of unjustified
inequality-the continued racial subordination of blacks long after the end of
legalized slavery. Accordingly, prohibiting racial subordination (the
underlying problem), instead of prohibiting acts that are contrary to
"established public policy," will better advance the goals of contextual
diversity.6"
can alter authoritative influence over the interpretation process.
Id.
60. Similarly, Professor Houh concludes that, for contract law, "[c]ontractual good faith may mean
one thing to a critical race scholar, another to a conventional law and economics scholar, and another to a
law and market economy scholar." Houh, supra note 24, at 1051.
61. See MALLOY,supra note 5, at 6-16, 104-10 (explaining framing, referencing, and representing).
62. In recommending the abolition of the public policy limitation in favor of an explicit rule
prohibiting invidious racial discrimination by tax-exempt charities, this article draws on the teachings of
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With this understanding of the charitable tax exemption as a backdrop,
the article now begins to show how "contextual diversity" implicitly
permeates various aspects of the exemption.
Ill. THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION-MORE THAN JUST TAX RELIEF
The charitable tax exemption consists of many varied and complex
components. This section of the article describes these components in order
to demonstrate that the charitable tax exemption is more than just relief of a
financial obligation to pay a federal tax on income. Indeed, many charities
arguably do not have income63 or, if they do, they seek tax-exempt status
primarily for reasons that have nothing to do with the federal income tax
exemption.64 Thus, the purpose of this section is to show the important and
vital role the charitable tax exemption plays in daily life from the standpoint
ofjustice, fairness, equality, and other non-economic values. This section also
articulates that, along with the general income tax exemption, tax-exempt
charities receive many other benefits and must bear many burdens. In short,
the charitable tax exemption is about much more than mere tax relief; it is
about how private market actors benefit from having corporations that are
profit-focused in addition to having corporations that are mission-focused.5
A. The Exemption
At its most basic level, the charitable income tax exemption that is the
subject of this article is the statutory relief from the obligation of certain
nonprofit corporations to pay tax on annual income.6 This relief is granted
pursuant to federal law and is given automatically to those corporations that
Critical Race Theory regarding legal rules and principles that are "originally" prompted by racial discord
but that avoid explicitly mentioning race in the formally adopted legal rule or doctrine. See, e.g., Jerome
McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understanding, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 39, 67- 77 ("This liberal view of the Constitution and race, that race is better left unexplored, prevailed
in much of the constitutional drafting.").
63. See generally Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 305, 307-14 (concluding that certain
"nonprofit organizations ... should be wholly exempted from income taxation, because they do not realize
'income' in the ordinary sense of that term").
64. See Brody, supra note 3, at 597-605 (discussing property tax motivations for charitable
exemptions).
65. The essential implications ofwhat it means to be mission-focused are outlined in the section on
"proper purpose." See infra Part HllC.2.
66. See I.R.C. § 501(a).
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apply for and are granted tax-exempt charitable status.6" A variety of
corporations other than charities are entitled to income tax exemption,
including social welfare organizations, 6 labor organizations, 69 business
leagues" and social clubs,7 just to name a few.72 However, charitable
nonprofits, unlike practically all other tax-exempt nonprofits, are special in a
variety of ways. For instance, with few exceptions, charities are the only tax-
exempt nonprofits that are also eligible to receive charitable donations from
the public that entitle the donor to federal income tax benefits." Federal law
provides that individuals and corporations that donate money or property to
charitable corporations may be entitled to receive a tax savings when
computing their own tax liability. The potential savings can be quite
significant depending on the amount of the donation,74 the type of property
donated," the income of the donor,76 and the type of charity to which the
donation is given.77 This ability to receive tax deductible donations from the
public is the key federal tax law distinction between charities and other tax-
exempt nonprofits.5
In order to obtain tax-exempt charitable status, a desiring nonprofit
corporation must file certain forms with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
seeking such status.79 This is no small task. The forms are very complex and
seek a voluminous amount of information concerning proposed organizational
structure, proposed activities, financial assets, expected and past revenue
streams, proposed policies, and much more."° Pursuant to federal law, the IRS
67. Id. § 501(c)(3).
68. Id. § 501(c)(4).
69. Id. § 501(c)(5).
70. Id. § 501(c)(6).
71. Id. § 501(c)(7).
72. See id. § 501(c) (listing more than 20 different types of tax-exempt organizations).
73. See id. § 170(a). See § I 70(c)(4) for exceptions for special funds in fraternal societies, etc.
74. See id. § 170(a).
75. See id. § 170(b)(1)(C) (imposing limits on deductibility of certain capital gain property).
76. See id. § 170(b)(l)(A), (B) (imposing limits based on an individual contributor's adjusted gross
income).
77. See id. § 170(b)(1)(B), (D) (imposing limits based on whether the charity is a private foundation
or not).
78. Although the charitable tax deduction for individuals who contribute to charities is a key aspect
of charitable corporations, this article does not attempt to incorporate the deduction component into an
overall rationalization of the exemption. Others who have attempted to draft a theory of tax exemption have
similarly omitted discussion of the charitable tax deduction because of the "different issues" raised. See
Hansmann, supra note 3, at 55-56.
79. Section 508(a) requires filing of IRS Form 1023.
80. IRS Form 1023 requires the applicant to disclose basic identification information. It also
requires disclosure of information about the organizational structure, compensation of officers, members
20061
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
must evaluate the information provided on these forms to determine if the
applicant's proposed activities and organizational structure are consistent with
activities and structures that are deemed "charitable." Importantly, if the IRS
determines that the information provided on the organization's forms do not
adequately comply with the law, then the IRS, subject to later judicial review,
has sole discretion as to whether to grant or deny the applicant tax-exempt
charitable status." Further, even if it grants tax-exempt charitable status based
on the applicant's organizational documents, the IRS can later revoke that
status if the applicant does not operate in compliance with federal law. 2
Accordingly, even after its initial submission of forms seeking tax-exempt
charitable status, a charity must often also submit annual information reports
to the IRS concerning its on-going operations.83
These extensive requirements related to obtaining and maintaining tax-
exempt charitable status provide one with just a glimpse of the many aspects
of the charitable tax exemption that go far beyond merely being excluded from
the requirement to pay federal income tax. Granted, all tax-exempt
nonprofits--charitable or not--must file forms seeking tax-exempt status. 4
However, the forms required for tax-exempt charitable status are much more
involved and much more complicated than those required of other tax-exempt
nonprofits.s Perhaps the added complexity is due in part to the additional
financial impact on tax revenues that accompanies granting tax exemption to
an organization that will also be eligible to receive tax deductible donations
from the public. But the added complexity could also be related to something
else, something that has nothing to do with dollars. Perhaps the added
complexity has something to do with the nature of charities in a market
society. Indeed, the reason charities are eligible to receive tax deductible
of the organization, activities, financial data, public charity status, and user fee information. There are also
various schedules that will need tobe filled out depending on the type of organization. See IRS Form 1023,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023 .pdf.
81. Section 7805(a) delegates to the Treasury Department, who further delegates to the IRS, the
power to prescribe all needful rules and regulations concerning the enforcement of the Internal Revenue
Code.
82. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (as amending in 1990) (describing the operational
requirement).
83. Section 6033 requires all exempt organizations to file an annual informational return (either IRS
Form 990 or 990T).
84. See IRS Form 1024, available athttp://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/flO24.pdf(required for non-
charities).
85. One example of the added complexity of Form 1023 as compared to Form 1024 is that Form
1023 asks more specific and detailed questions about the organization's activities. On the other hand, Form
1024 allows the organization to write a narrative of its activities with only a few minimum requirements.
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contributions is that they are required to use these monies for charitable
purposes, as opposed to mutual benefit purposes as is the case with other tax-
exempt nonprofits. Thus, when the IRS grants an organization tax-exempt
charitable status, it is not only excusing the organization from the requirement
to pay federal income tax; it is also signaling to potential donors that the
organization has given every indication that the donation will be used for
charitable purposes and that the public can trust in this assurance.
B. Benefits of the Exemption
In addition to being excused from the requirement to pay tax on annual
income, the charitable tax exemption opens doors to a variety of other
economic and non-economic benefits. Among the economic benefits to a
nonprofit corporation with tax-exempt charitable status are relief from the
requirement to pay federal unemployment taxes, 6 access to tax-exempt
government bonds,87 and eligibility for preferred postal rates.88 In addition to
these direct economic benefits, tax-exempt charities are also eligible for many
indirect economic benefits granted by state and local governments. Some of
these state and local economic benefits include exemption from state and local
income taxes, 9 state and local sales taxes,9" and local real property taxes.9
Thus, to the extent that a nonprofit corporation has economic motivations for
seeking tax-exempt charitable status, those motivations may relate to the
federal income tax exemption or, possibly, to one or more of the many other
economic benefits.
86. I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8). Under the present system, charities onlyhave to pay the "equivalent of the
former employees' unemployment compensation." Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed
by Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 85, 101-02 (1993).
87. Ninety five percent of the net proceeds from these tax-exempt bonds must be used by the charity
and all property purchased with the bond proceeds has to be owned exclusively by the charity. I.R.C.
§ 145(a)(1) (allowing state and local governments to issue bonds paying interest, exempt from federal
income tax, to organizations described in § 501(c)(3)).
88. The current postal regulations givereligious, educational, scientific, philanthropic, agricultural,
labor, veterans', and fraternal organizations second and third class nonprofit rates. Facchina et al., supra
note 86, at 112. The only requirement is that the nonprofit mailers must be organized and operated for the
primary purpose of the organization. Id. at 113.
89. For example, Pennsylvania provides an exemption to charities from state and local income taxes.
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7204(i 0) (West 2005).
90. Illinois automatically exempts § 501(c)(3) organizations from its sale/use tax. 35 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 105/3 -5 (West 2005).




Importantly, there are many non-economic benefits that accompany tax-
exempt charitable status that might be more "valuable" than the various
economic benefits. For example, the "halo effect" that accompanies charitable
status may have no economic value at all. The "halo effect" is that
indeterminable aspect of charitable status that results in positive emotional
effects. These positive effects may exhibit themselves in many ways.
Examples include when one gives money to a church without concern for
receiving a charitable tax deduction, when one serves on a charitable board
without expectation of financial payment for services, or when the public just
generally has a positive view of an institution due solely to the fact that it is
mission-driven as opposed to profit-driven. Even though the halo effect
produces real "value"--both for the corporation and for the public at large,
that value is not often calculable in economic terms.
In addition to the halo effect, the charitable tax exemption allows for
diversity and experimentation that often lead to production of undiscovered
values.92 While these values may eventually be calculable, they are at first
indeterminable and unknown. Finally, some aspects of the charitable activity
are not reducible to dollars and cents and are, therefore, not capable of the
types of comparison required for economic analysis. For example, economic
values do not fully reflect the value of an education in a multi-racial
environment as compared to a racially segregated environment. These ethical,
emotional, moral, and indeterminate values of charities are not something that
can be fully explained in terms of economic efficiency, often because the
value is shared by the charity and by those not associated with the charity.93
Thus, these non-economic values cannot be easily, or sometimes not at all,
translated into economic terminology.94
92. One of the non-economic benefits that accompany tax-exempt charitable status is the production
of undiscovered values. Tax-exempt charitable status often provides an incentive for exploration of
unpopular or unprofitable ventures. For example, the Center for the Expansion of Fundamental Rights is
a tax-exempt organization whose primary purpose is to obtain "fundamental legal rights--such as bodily
integrity and bodily liberty for nonhuman animals." Symposium, Ten Years ofAnimal Law at Lewis &
Clark Law School, Remarks: The Evolving Legal Status of Chimpanzees, 9 ANIMAL L. 1,25 (2003). Such
an organization would not be able to exist without charitable tax exemption because there is no market
interest in such a cause. Because of the tax benefits associated with charitable status, the organization can
continue its primary purpose of obtaining fundamental legal rights for nonhuman animals. The benefits
of improved bio-diversity can lead to scientific innovations, such as a cure for cancer, which are currently
unknown or indeterminable in economic terms.
93. One of the principle aspects of LMT, discussed supra Part I, is that many apparent two-party
exchanges or relationships often involve others who are not directly involved in the market exchange.
94. It is precisely because charities seek to promote values that are difficult to measure using
economic terms that the nonprofit legal framework has been noted as raising "important cultural interpretive
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C. Obligations that Flow from the Exemption
Aside from the many benefits that accompany tax-exempt charitable
status, there are many obligations that a charitable corporation must abide by
in order to obtain and maintain such status. Some of these obligations were
previously alluded to in connection with the discussion of the requirement to
file forms seeking charitable status and the requirement to annually report
information concerning activities and operations. 95 Statutorily, in order to
obtain a charitable income tax exemption, a corporation must be:
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing forpublic
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition..., or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation .., and which does not participate in, or intervene
in..., any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office. 96
This statutory requirement has been described as imposing several affirmative
and negative obligations on tax-exempt charities.
1. Affirmative Obligations
a. "Organized" and "operated"
Affirmatively, tax-exempt charities must show that they are both
"organized" and "operated" exclusively for a proper (or charitable) purpose.
The "organized" requirement is met, quite straightforwardly, when the
nonprofit applicant's organizing documents9 7 and its federal forms used to
apply for tax-exempt charitable status98 are in compliance with the law. 99
Most notably, the organizing documents must clearly indicate that all assets
of the proposed charity, upon dissolution, will go to other tax-exempt
issues." See MALLOY, supra note 5, at 214.
95. See infra Part III.A.
96. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
97. For example, by-laws and articles of incorporation.
98. E.g., IRS Form 1023.
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1990).
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charities."' Further, the organizational documents must state that all assets
will be used in compliance with statutory requirements applicable to tax-
exempt charities, namely for charitable purposes and not for inappropriate
political, lobbying, or private purposes.'0 ' In other words, the organizing
documents must affirmatively demonstrate that all charitable assets will
remain in the charitable stream and that no profits will be inappropriately paid
to private or political interests. The "operated" requirement is essentially the
same as the organizational requirement, except that the operated requirement
is concerned with whether the actual activities performed by the tax-exempt
charity are consistent with the statutory requirements.t°2 Thus, not only must
the nonprofit applicant say that it will be charitable, it must also demonstrate
its charitableness by its actions.
b. Proper (or charitable) purpose
The proper purpose requirement is at the heart of the charitable tax
exemption. This requirement imposes an obligation on the charity to have a
special type of mission focus as opposed to a profit focus. The mission is not
just any mission and is distinctly different from the mutual benefit mission of
non-charitable nonprofit corporations 03 Instead, the mission that constitutes
a proper purpose for the charitable tax exemption must be what is collectively
referred to as a charitable purpose. For simplicity, this article uses the term
"charitable" in a broad sense, referring to any variety of public purposes that
might be acceptable under the statute. 4 Some of these purposes are
specifically delineated in the statute-religious and educational, for example.
However, many charitable purposes have to be gleaned, by either the IRS or
reviewing courts, from the statute. Some purposes that have been recognized
as "charitable" include providing relief to the poor,0 5 protecting the
environment, 1°6 combating community deterioration,'0 7 providing homes for
100. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4).
101. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(3).
102. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
103. A "mutual benefit" mission is one that is focused on primarily benefiting a particular group of
persons who are oftentimes members. For example, a nonprofit social club or fraternity is a mutual benefit
organization. See Hansmann, supra note 3, at 93-96.
104. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-!(d)(2) (as amended in 1990).
106. Id.; Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152.
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990); Rev. RuL 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115.
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the elderly,"°8 improving health, 09 and manymore."0 All of these specifically
recognized charitable purposes have at least one thing in common-they all
seem to impart some "valued" benefit upon the public and not just a defined
mutual benefit (or membership) group.
A key question for the charitable tax exemption is how to determine
whether a particular purpose is "charitable" or not."' True, a purpose that is
arguably a subset of already recognized charitable purposes does not present
many conceptual difficulties. For instance, if an organization has as its
mission the protection of swamp land, that organization's purpose is probably
charitable because it involves protection of the environment in its natural
state-a well-established charitable purpose.'12 But there are at least three
distinct ways in which determining whether a particular purpose is charitable
or not charitable becomes conceptually more complicated. The first instance
is when a newly proposed purpose does not appear to fit within a subset of an
already recognized charitable purpose. That is, what if, in order to conclude
that a particular purpose is charitable, one would necessarily have to add
another item to the list of potential charitable purposes. For example, would
it have been "charitable" for Frederick Douglass to advocate that slavery was
morally wrong during a time when slavery was completely legal and thought
by many to be morally acceptable? Was it "charitable" for Nicolaus
Copernicus to advocate that the sun, and not the earth, was the center of our
universe at a time in history when all believed that the earth indeed was the
center of the universe? The underlying conceptual quandary is not how these
questions would be answered in hindsight, but rather, how they should be
answered when they arise.
The second instance in which defining the term "charitable" becomes
conceptually difficult is when the nature of a previously recognized charitable
purpose has changed such that it no longer seems to be charitable. This
conceptual difficulty is most prevalent today in the field of healthcare and the
exemption of hospitals as "charitable" nonprofit corporations." 3 Historically,
108. Treas. Reg § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990); Rev. RuL 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145.
109. Treas. Reg § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1990); Rev. RuL 77-69, 1977-1 C.B. 143.
110. See generally DARRYL K. JONES ET AL., THE TAX LAW OF CHARITIES AND OTHER EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 129-65 (2003)(discussing standards of tax exemption for hospitals, health maintenance
organizations, emergency rooms, and public interest law firms).
11l. See Hansmann, supra note 3, at 57-58 ("[T]he repeated and unreflective reinterpretation of the
exemption to accommodate new forms ofnonprofit [charitable] activity... offers clear evidence of the lack
of, and need for, a coherent policy on which to base the exemption.").
112. Rev. Rul. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175.
113. See Hansmann, supra note 3, at 65-67 (arguing that many hospitals and other commercial
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hospitals were granted charitable tax-exempt status because they provided
health care to the poor, an established charitable purpose. 1 4  Over time,
however, this view of the basis for exempting hospitals changed such that
hospitals no longer are required to provide health care to the poor." 5 Thus,
we have a healthcare market in the United States in which for-profit hospitals
operate alongside charitable nonprofit hospitals." 6 Does this state of affairs
indicate that hospitals should no longer be tax-exempt because efficiency
analysis suggests that hospitals would exist with or without the exemption?" 7
If so, is there some value aside from efficiency which would indicate that,
despite the economics, we still need tax-exempt hospitals? Pursuant to
contextual diversity, if the economic analysis suggests that hospitals should
no longer be tax-exempt, an additional question to ask is whether there are
values besides economic efficiency which would suggest continuing to exempt
hospitals.
The third instance in which defining the term "charitable" becomes
conceptually difficult is when a proposed purpose violates the public policy
nonprofits should not be tax-exempt as charities).
114. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, modified by, Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 203
(stating that a hospital must operate to the extent of "its financial ability for those not able to pay for the
services rendered" in order to sustain exemption under § 501 (c)(3)).
115. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94 (hospital does not have to operate emergency room open to
the poor to sustain § 501(cX3) tax exemption if health planning agency has found that this would
unnecessarily "duplicate emergency services and facilities that are adequately provided by another medical
institution in the community").
116. The same dual tract phenomenon exists in other areas as well, such as homes for the aged. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 61-72, 1961-1 C.B. 188 (stating that a home for the aged is exempt if it is dedicated to
providing, among other things, care and housing to aged individuals who would otherwise be unable to
provide for themselves without hardship); Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145 (concluding that, as an
alternative to Revenue Ruling 61-72, "an organization... which devotes its resources to the operation of
a home for the aged will qualify for charitable status .. . if it operates in a manner designed to satisfy the
three primary needs of aged persons. These are the need for housing, the need for health care, and the need
for financial security.").
117. See generally Hansmann, supra note 3, at 89. Professor HansrMnn explains:
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that there is justification for the ... decision to exempt
nonprofit hospitals from taxation even if they provide no research, teaching, or subsidized care for
indigents; that is, even if they are operated as strictly commercial nonprofits. Problems of contract
failure do not seem important in the case of nst hospital services. The continued predominance
of the nonprofit form in this industry seems, instead, to be attributable to historical and financial
factors largely unrelated to the relative efficiency of for-profit and nonprofit institutions.
Id.
A related question might be: Does this state of affairs indicate that we should adopt a law which
prohibits the operation of for-profit hospitals, leaving the entire market to the nonprofit sector? Although
this question is just as important for economic analysis purposes, it is not as critical here because it does
not directly bear on the issue of whether hospital operation is "charitable" and entitled to tax-exempt status.
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doctrine, a doctrine adopted by the Court and now incorporated into tax-
exempt charity law. Pursuant to the public policy doctrine an organization
that is otherwise "charitable" will not be eligible for charitable tax exemption
if it engages in acts that contravene "clear" or "established" public policy. "8
The prototypical example of an instance in which the public policy doctrine
would defeat charitable status is racial discrimination against blacks. For
example, the Supreme Court affirmed the IRS' revocation of charitable status
for a nonprofit religious school that discriminated against blacks in its
admission policies." 9
The public policy doctrine, as applied to racial discrimination against
blacks, is not problematic in the sense that it is nearly universally accepted
that discrimination against a person because she is black is morally repugnant.
However, the public policy doctrine becomes difficult to apply in instances
other than invidious racial discrimination against blacks. For example, should
the public policy doctrine be applied in such a way as to deny charitable status
to nonprofit schools that make racial preferences in the context of affirmative
action? 2 ' While efficiency analysis might suggest that all racial preferences
are prohibited by the public policy doctrine, how does this analysis
accommodate the teachings of Critical Race Theory, which teaches that race
based affirmative action is meaningfully different from invidious racial
discrimination? 2' Thus, the conceptual difficulty with the public policy
doctrine is how does one determine the existence of "clear" or "established"
public policies other than the policy against invidious racial discrimination?
Addressing these three instances of conceptual difficulty concerning the
meaning of the term "charitable"-new purposes, old purposes, and anti-
public policy purposes-must lay at the heart of any theory of charitable tax
exemption. If the charitable tax exemption has any normative coherence, it
would seem that the coherence must somehow address these purposes, since
they collectively represent the areas in which the parameters of the exemption
are most often tested. Such is the implicit assumption of all existing theories
of charitable tax exemption.' While many of the existing theories of
charitable tax exemption rationalize portions of these conceptually difficult
118. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("A corollary to the public
benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the purpose of a charitable
trust may not be illegal or violate established public policy.").
119. Id. at 612.
120. See David A. Brennen, Race-Conscious Affirmative Action by Tax-Exempt 501(c)(3)
Corporations After Grutter and Gratz, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 711, 725-30 (2003).
121. See discussion of critical race theory supra Part I.B.
122. See discussion of various theories infra Part IV.
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aspects of defining "charitable," many do not.'23 In many cases, the lack of
rationalization might be due to the absence of concern for that which cannot
be rationalized by efficiency analysis. But that is the point--efficiency
analysis cannot rationalize or explain all that exists in law. And while some
theories of the charitable tax exemption have gone beyond efficiency and have
resorted to non-economic analysis to explain the charitable tax exemption,
even these theories-arguably--do not go far enough.
Like the existing theories of charitable tax exemption, the contextual
diversity theory espoused in this article presumes that understanding the scope
of the term "charitable" is key to understanding the normative rationale for the
exemption. It is not enough to say that "charitable" simply means that which
benefits the public. Where does that get us? How should we determine
whether any particular activity benefits the public? Importantly, how should
we determine whether a particular activity, that could benefit the public if
done in a particular way, fails to do so because it contravenes "established
public policy?" LMT, as explained earlier in this article, suggests that we may
not be able to define the outer limits of charity (public benefit) due to the
dynamic, ever-changing, and transformative nature of the marketplace.'24
Thus, the best we can hope for is to continually re-evaluate, from a variety of
perspectives, what actually provides a benefit to the public. While many of
these perspectives might involve economic analysis, many will not. Instead,
"public benefit" may at times be determined based upon humanistic or other
non-economic conceptions of justice, fairness, equality, or other important
values.
2. Negative Obligations
In addition to the many affirmative obligations that flow from tax-exempt
charitable status, many negative obligations also exist. Among the negative
obligations are limits on political campaigning, legislative lobbying, private
inurement, and private benefit.
123. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 330-33.
124. Professor Malloy explains:
Law and market economy theory involves the study of the social/market exchange process by
focusing on the relationship between law, culture, and markets. This relationship is triadic, dynamic
and multi-directional. Moreover, in this relationship, one can understand the market sphere as
expressing a concern for individualization, with a market focus on the pursuit of self-interest. On
the other hand, culture is a collective concept, and therefore the cultural sphere can be understood
as expressing a community perspective or a notion of the public interest.
Malloy, supra note 11, at 63-64.
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a. Politics and lobbying
The political campaign prohibition provides that tax-exempt charities
cannot "participate in, or intervene in.... any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.' 2' Textually, this is an
absolute prohibition in the sense that any amount of prohibited political
campaign activity by a tax-exempt charity will result in the charity's loss of
tax-exempt status. However, the IRS has indicated that even political-looking
activities that may otherwise be covered by the political campaign prohibition
will not cause loss of exemption if the activities do not show a bias for (or
against) a candidate.'26 Additionally, the political campaign prohibition does
not foreclose many activities often associated with political campaigns, such
as voter education and "get out the vote" campaigns. Thus, the primary aim
of the political campaign prohibition for charities is to prevent the usurpation
of a charity for private, as opposed to public, political purposes.
The legislative lobbying limitation provides that "no substantial part of
the activities" of a charity can consist of "carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided
in subsection (h))."'21  This lobbying limitation effectively means that a
charity cannot lobby elected officials so as to affect legislation in a particular
(biased) way. Unlike the political campaign prohibition, the lobbying
limitation is not a complete ban on legislative lobbying. Instead, the lobbying
limitation only prohibits charities from engaging in more than an insubstantial
amount of lobbying. Additionally, the lobbying limitation does not prohibit
certain types of activities that clearly benefit the public, such as speaking at
a legislative hearing concerning legislation pursuant to an invitation of the
legislative officials.'28 Thus, much like the political campaign prohibition, the
apparent aim of the lobbying limitation is to limit lobbying where it
presumably fails to provide a public (as opposed to private) benefit.
Together, the political campaign prohibition and the legislative lobbying
limitation serve to limit a charity's involvement in government matters to the
extent that little public benefit is likely to result. Arguably, these limitations
on governmental influence might be required even without the textual
expression of them in the statute, at least to the extent that the campaigning or
125. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
126. See JONES ET AL., supra note 110, at 472.
127. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
128. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(3) (1990).
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lobbying either violates one of the other negative requirements for
exemption'29 or causes a violation of the "exclusivity" requirement. 3
However, having the textual expression of these limitations in the statute gives
force to their anti-public aspects. While the campaign prohibition and the
lobbying limitation may indeed have economic rationales, they could just as
well have non-economic political rationales. For example, it could be that
these government involvement limitations are a reflection of the sovereignty
view of the charitable tax exemption-that is, the view that charities are a type
of sovereign akin to state and local government entities.'3 ' Accordingly, any
theory which attempts a normative explanation for the charitable tax
exemption must also address this government involvement limitation.
b. Private inurement/benefit
Like the other negative obligations, the private inurement prohibition and
the private benefit limitation have statutory origins. The private inurement
prohibition provides that "no part of the net earnings" of a tax-exempt charity
can "inure[ ] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."'3 This
prohibition has been a part of tax-exempt charity law in the United States
since the first corporate tax exemption in 1909 and, in fact, was the only
negative obligation for charities at that time.' That original private
inurement prohibition expressly prohibited distribution of the charity's
financial surplus to the charity's controllers. Thus, the focus, at that time, was
on preventing managers and others who controlled a charity from improperly
taking profits from the charity.
The law regarding private inurement is structured in much the same way
today in that the private inurement prohibition prevents certain "insiders"
from taking charity profits other than as fair compensation for benefits
conferred upon the charitable corporation. The prohibition is absolute in the
sense that even if a "scintilla" of charitable profits go to insiders, the
charitable exemption is lost.'34 The term "insiders" is not defined in the
129. See discussion of private benefit or private inurement prohibition infra Part ILC.2.b.
130. See JONES ET AL., supra note 110, at 446.
131. Brody, supra note 3, at 589.
132. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
133. See JONES ET AL., supra note 110, at 306; see also Corporation Excise Tax of 1909, ch. 6, § 38,
36 Stat. 113. In the first corporate tax exemption law, the only expressly stated requirement was that any
financial surplus derived from conducting the charitable endeavor could not be distributed to those who
control the entity by which charity is delivered. See JONES ET AL., supra note 110, at 306.
134. Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla oflndividual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and Excess
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statute except to state that charitable profits cannot go to any "private
shareholder or individual." The IRS and the courts have developed divergent
interpretations of precisely who might be considered an insider. Under the
IRS' expansive view of the term, "insiders" are persons having a personal or
private interest in the activities of the charity. 3 ' Thus, insiders could include
those who have actual control of the corporation (such as board members and
managers) and those who have virtual or constructive control of the charity
(such as employees, and even independent contractors). The courts, on the
other hand, take a less expansive view of the phrase "insiders," often limiting
the phrase to board members and creators of the charity.136
The private inurement prohibition clearly illustrates an important aspect
of this article's thesis that economic analysis alone cannot fully explain the
charitable tax exemption. Economic analysis only tells us that diversion of
corporate profits from a charity to private interests (insiders) is prohibited.
What economic analysis does not necessarily tell us is how to determine who
an "insider" might be. Should one take an expansive view of the term
"insider," which would severely limit certain aspects of permissible charity
operations? Or should one take a narrow view, which may open up
possibilities for charity operations that might not otherwise exist? Whichever
view one takes, economic analysis alone does not necessarily drive the entire
decision. For instance, if one has a perspective of law which views
government involvement in private affairs as undesirable, such as the view
taken by many conservatives, one might choose a narrow view of the term
"insider." On the other hand, if one has a perspective of law which welcomes
government supervision of charities-a liberal view-one might choose the
more expansive view of the term "insider." Thus, one's political perspective
of law-either conservative or liberal, for example-might determine which
view of the term "insider" is more valuable without regard to efficiency.
Although the private benefit limitation is also statutorily based, it is not
as explicitly spelled out in the statute as is the private inurement prohibition.
Instead, the private benefit prohibition resulted from interpretation of the term
"exclusively" as used in the charitable exemption statute.' The IRS and
Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 591 (2000). The legislative histcry forthe first corporate tax exemption law
provides that certain entities provide no person with a "scintilla of individual profit" from the entity. 44
CONG. REc. 4150-51 (1909) (statement of Sen. Bacon).
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (as amended in 1982).
136. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 1999).
137. "Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes .... I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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various courts have determined that the term "exclusively" really means
"primarily."' 3 s Thus, a tax-exempt charity will be considered exclusively
charitable so long as it is primarily charitable. This means that a tax-exempt
charity can perform a small amount of private benefit in addition to its
primarily public benefit functions.'39 In addition to not being an absolute
prohibition, another difference between the private inurement prohibition and
the private benefit limitation is that the private benefit limitation is not
focused solely on "insiders." According to the IRS, if a charity provides more
than an insubstantial amount of private benefit to anyone-insider or not-it
will no longer be considered "exclusively" charitable. Thus, despite the
differences in terms of substantiality and prohibited beneficiaries, the private
benefit limitation works in conjunction with the private inurement prohibition
to ensure that charitable assets remain in the charitable (public) stream.
As with the other aspects of the charitable tax exemption, a theory of the
exemption should attempt to account for the private benefit and private
inurement aspects of the exemption. Indeed, every theory espoused thus far
has not only accounted for the private benefit and private inurement
obligations; these obligations play a central role in every economic rationale
for the charitable tax exemption. 4 This is as it should be. For without the
138. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990); Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92
T.C. 1053, 1065 (1989).
139. One area in which this aspect of the private benefit limitation has caused controversy is when
a charity joins with a for-profit entity to form a partnership. See, e.g., St. David's Health Care Sys. v.
United States, 349 F3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003); Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999). The
government and taxpayers disagree as to how the private benefit limitation should be interpreted in this
context. For instance, the predominant government view is that the creation of the partnership causes loss
of charitable status if the charity does not have control of the partnership. St. David's Healthcare Sys., 349
F.3d at 239; Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. Charities, on the other hand, argue that the issue is not
control, but rather whether the partnership actually functions as an exclusively charitable entity. In at least
one jurisdiction (the 5th Circuit), the court has determined that control is the appropriate standard:
However, we cannot agree with St. David's suggestion that the central issue in this case is whether
the partnership provides some (or even an extensive amount of) charitable services. It is important
to keep in mind that § 501(c)(3) confers tax-exempt status only on those organizations that operate
exclusively in furtherance of exempt purposes. As a result, in determining whether an organization
satisfies the operational test, we do not simply consider whether the organization's activities further
its charitable purposes. We must also ensure that those activities do not substantiallyfurther other
(non-charitable) purposes. If more than an "insubstantial" amount of the partnership's activities
further non-charitable interests, then St. David's can no longer be deemed to operate exclusively for
charitable purposes.
St. David's Healthcare Sys., 349 F.3d at 236-37 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
140. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 3, at 72. Professor Hansmann articulates the crux of his
efficiency-based capital subsidy theory of tax exemption as relying on the non-distribution constraint, which
is the principle that a nonprofit organization is prohibited from distributing its net earnings to insiders:
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requirement that private benefit and inurement be minimized, it is difficult to
comprehend any coherent explanation for the charitable tax exemption. Thus,
to this extent, economic analysis does have true value as an analytic tool.
LMT teaches us that some aspects of law can and should be explained by
economics. 4' However, this does not mean that all, or even most, aspects of
law can or should be so explained. Many aspects of law, including many
aspects of tax-exempt charity law, have rationales that are not amenable to
traditional neoclassical economic understanding or analysis. One cannot
necessarily place an economic value on notions of justice, fairness, and
equality that are not based on economic efficiency. Therefore, the key to
understanding the charitable tax exemption is recognizing that any theoretical
rationalization of the exemption must be broad-based and not rely only on
notions of positive economic efficiency. In order to better understand this
idea, Part I of this article explains how economic theories can be used
effectively with non-economic theories to both explain and sculpt law. LMT
articulates this idea and Professor Emily Houh has demonstrated its
application in understanding the good faith exception in contract law. 4' Now,
a few words about commercial competition of charities with for-profit
corporations and private foundation charities.
D. Commercial Competition
Even though they are mission-focused and not profit-focused, charities
often engage in commercial profit-making activities with the aim of furthering
a distinct charitable purpose. One common by-product of this manner of
operation is that charities sometimes compete with for-profit firms for market
dollars. This competition-actual or constructive-might result from either
of two possible circumstances. The first is when the charity engages in a
commercial activity for the sole purpose of raising money to advance its
There is an efficiency rationale for the exemption that is more appealing than those discussed above,
although it seems never to have been expressly offered before. That rationale is that the exemption
serves to compensate for difficulties that nonprofits have in raising capital, and that such a capital
subsidy can promote efficiency when employed in those industries in which nonprofit firms serve
consumers better than their for pmfit counterparts. Nonprofit organizations lack access to equity
capital since, by virtue of the nondistribution constraint, they cannot issue ownership shares that
give their holders a simultaneous right to participate in both net earnings and control.
Id.
141. Malloy, supra note 11, at 56-64.
142. See Houh, supra note 24, at 1038-54.
2006]
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
charitable mission.'43 A second circumstance of competition is when the
charity engages in a commercial activity in such a way that the activity itself
(as opposed to the revenues generated by the activity) furthers or constitutes
its charitable purpose. 4 4 In an effort to make the charitable tax exemption
more effectively focused on income generated by charitable activity, two
developments in the law occurred. The first development was the repeal of
the destination of income test for charitable exemption-thus making
charitable activity itself more important than how profits are used. 45 The
result was to prohibit charities from engaging in more than an insignificant
amount of non-charitable commercial activity with the aim of raising money
for a charitable purpose. The second development occurred in Congress with
the adoption of the unrelated business income tax in 1950,46 with later
revisions in 1969.' The institution of the unrelated business income tax
allows the law to treat nonprofit charities like all other types of corporations
to the extent that its activities are not mission-focused and produce income.
Thus, with these two legal developments, the federal income tax exemption
no longer applies to profits generated by a nonprofit charity if the activities
generating these profits are not themselves charitable. 4 '
As with many aspects of the charitable tax exemption, the basic idea of
dealing with unfair commercial competition by eliminating the destination of
income test and adopting the unrelated business income tax is surely
efficiency-rationalized. Indeed, the addition of these legal rules to tax-exempt
charity law advances the notion that only the income from activity that is
charitable will be exempted from the federal income tax. However, beyond
this basic idea, there are other issues to contend with concerning commercial
competition that cannot be resolved by economic efficiency analysis alone.
For instance, in the late 1990's the IRS had to decide whether and when to
treat payments made to charities by charitable event sponsors as tax-exempt
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(I) (as amended in 1990).
144. Id.
145. See I.R.C. § 502(a) (denying § 501 (a) exemption to feeder organizations).
146. See H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 36-37 (1950); S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 28-29 (1950), reprinted
in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3081-83.
147. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 46-48 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1648-49;
S. REP. No. 91-552, at 67-68 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2032-33.
148. A tax is imposed on the unrelated business income of a tax-exempt organization. I.R.C. § 511.
Unrelated business taxable income is any "gross income derived by an organization from any unrelated
trade or business." Id. § 512. Unrelated trade or business is "any trade or business [that] is not
substantially related ... to the exercise or peformance" of that organization's exempt purpose. Id. § 513.
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revenues or as taxable unrelated business income tax revenues.'49 Many
aspects of these corporate sponsorship issues were resolved not by economic
analysis, but by other non-economic perspectives of law. Thus, as is the case
with many aspects of law, economics can only go so far when it comes to a
theoretical rationalization for the charitable tax exemption. This means that
even economically motivated laws, such as tax law, could and should be
understood not only in terms of economics, but also in terms of non-economic
conceptions of justice and fairness. Part I of this article demonstrates more
explicitly how economic analysis can be used with other theories of law to
explain and shape law.
E. Private Foundations
Although many charities receive broad-based financial support from
government and non-governmental entities, many other charities do not have
such varied and wide-spread sources of financial support. When the financing
sources for a charity are concentrated in one or very few people-people who
might also have direct or indirect control over the charity-the potential for
abuse of tax-exempt status is more likely to occur than if the sources of
financial support and control are more widely dispersed. In recognition ofthis
reality, Congress enacted rules in 1950 that denied tax exemption to charities
that engaged in "prohibited transactions," unreasonably accumulated income,
were used substantially for non-exempt purposes, or had invested money so
as to jeopardize exempt purposes. 50 Congress exempted churches, schools
and colleges, hospitals, and certain publicly supported organizations from
these new rules."' These 1950 rules sparked the beginning of a distinction in
tax-exempt charity law between "public" charities and "private" charities
(private foundations) that continues today in a modified form.
149. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Nov. 22, 1991).
150. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 331, 64 Stat. 906,957-59. The Revenue Act of 1950
denied income tax exemption to private foundations that "engaged in a prohibited transaction." Id. at 958.
The term "prohibited transaction" was defined as including a transaction in which a charity "lends any part
of its income or corpus," "pays any compensation, in excess of a reasonable allowance," "makes any part
of its services available on a preferential basis," "makes any substantial purchase of securities... for more
than adequate consideration," "sells any substantial part of its ... propety, for less than an adequate
consideration" or "engages in any other transaction which results in a substantial diversion of its income
or corpus"[] to "the creator;" substantial contributor; a family member of a creator or family member; or
a corporation controlled by a creator. Id. at 957-58.
151. See S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 123-24 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3081-83.
2006]
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
In 1954 and 1964, Congress made additional legislative changes to further
distinguish so called "public" and "private" charities by providing for an
increased ceiling on charitable contribution deductions for contributions to
"public" charities.' These "public" charities included churches, schools,
hospitals, and "publicly and governmentally supported" charities. Finally, in
1969, Congress again acted to stem the tide of potential abuses by "private"
and so-called non-operating charitable foundations.' In that year, Congress
eliminated the rules that denied charitable tax exemption to these troublesome
charities and replaced those rules with new excise taxes that act as penalties
for charities that engage in potentially abusive behavior, including self-
dealing, 54 unreasonable income accumulations, 5 excess business holding,'56
risky investments,' and disfavored expenditures.'
The essential role of the private foundation rules is to control nonprofit
corporations that express a desire to be mission-focused, but that lack a public
mandate that would support the mission. For example, assume a wealthy
individual has a family member who contracts a rare incurable disease. If
neither the government nor any existing private organization is currently
searching for a cure for that disease, the wealthy individual could either fund
the research on her own, or she could donate the money to a self-created
charity whose sole mission is to find a cure. While this self-created charity is
most certainly mission-focused, the fact that neither the government nor any
other private group is researching this disease indicates a lack of a public
mandate for finding a cure. The lack of a public mandate, however, does not
mean that the effort at finding a cure is not a proper charitable purpose.
Nonetheless, the lack of widespread public involvement in this effort may lead
to financial abuses of the self-created charitable corporation in terms of
investments and the like. The private foundation rules are intended to hone
in on the areas of potential abuse and, thereby, protect the charitable fisc. The
heart of the private foundation rules is the definition of the term "private
foundation."'" 9 A private foundation is a charitable corporation that lacks a
152. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 29-30 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4623,4660; S. REP.
No. 88-830, at 58-59 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673, 1730-33.
153. See I.R.C. §§ 4941-4945.
154. Id. § 4941.
155. See id. § 4942.
156. Id. § 4943.
157. See id. § 4944.
158. See id. § 4945.
159. Id. § 509(a).
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wide array of public support 16 or public patrons.1 6 1 Thus, the proxy for the
public mandate is the presence of a wide array of financial support and
supporters. In some cases, the charitable purposes themselves (e.g., churches,
hospitals, and schools) serve as the proxy. 61
The presence of the private foundation rules is consistent with contextual
diversity because the rules permit all sorts of purposes to be advanced by tax-
exempt charitable status-not only purposes that many people agree are of
benefit to the public or are willing to fund, but also purposes that very few
believe might benefit the public or are willing to fund. To demonstrate the
benefit of private foundations, consider the example of the Howard Hughes
Medical Institute-a private foundation that, at nearly $11 billion, is the
second richest private foundation in the country.1 63 The foundation originated
from the personal fortune of one man, Howard Hughes, who created the
foundation in the early 1950's as a personal tax shelter to protect his fortune.
The stated purpose of the foundation is to do medical research. Although the
foundation did no research for a number of years, its research efforts have
since resulted in discovery of the genes responsible for cystic fibrosis and
muscular dystrophy, a non-invasive test for colon cancer, and a drug that
fights leukemia. More recently, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute has
created new stem cell lines for future medical research-something that the
federal government is prohibited from doing due to a Presidential directive.'64
Without this privately funded charity, these many valuable discoveries might
not have occurred.
While diversity means that we have these opportunities for creativity that
might not otherwise exist, they must be considered in context. Given the
private nature of the funding source and the incentive for tax law abuse, the
private foundation rules serve the governmental/public purpose of stemming
the likelihood of tax abuse while still permitting the substantive charitable
160. See id. § 509(a)(1).
161. See id. § 509(a)(2).
162. See id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
163. 60 Minutes: Howard Hughes Medical Institute (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 23, 2003).
Although the Howard Hughes Medical Institute is not technically a private foundation (it is a medical
research institute as defined in § 170(b)(1 )(a)(iii)),see DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS'
REPORT 11 (2006), available at http://www.hhmi.org/about/pdf/HHM2005AuditReport.pdf, the IRS treats
it as a private foundation for some purposes. See Faculty of Medicine Memorial Minute: George Widmer
Thorn, HARV. U. GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 2005, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2005/
11.03/08-mm.html.
164. See The President's Radio Address, 37 PuB. PAPERS 33 (Aug. 20, 2001) (transcript available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html) (limiting stem cell research to60
existing stem cell lines).
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functions to take place. Thus, the private foundation rules are a recognition
of the fact that even private individuals can create great wealth and value for
society. These rules are also a recognition of the fact that government, as a
proxy for the public, has a strong interest in not allowing individuals to abuse
the charitable tax exemption. In essence, the private foundation rules reflect
the diverse ways in which public benefit might be "discovered." Diversity is
a very important aspect of the charitable tax exemption. Contextual diversity
is important because it recognizes the important role of diversity while also
allowing charity tax law to mediate or modulate diversity in order to arrive at
the right mix of public interests and private interests represented in the
charitable tax exemption. This mediating aspect of the charitable tax
exemption must accommodate a variety of value interests-both economic and
non-economic value interests. Part I of this article explains in greater detail
how economic values can be effectively combined with other non-economic
values to form a more complete theoretical understanding of law and,
potentially, aid in better refining law in the future.
IV. EFFICIENCY THEORIES OF CHARITABLE EXEMPTION
Traditional theories of the charitable tax exemption-at least those
promulgated prior to 1990-are principally based on concepts of economic
efficiency. These efficiency-based theories explain the charitable tax
exemption as either a subsidy by government for public goods,'65 a necessary
result of using net income to define tax liability,'66 or a means of
compensating charities for capital constraints.'67 Other efficiency-based
theories contend that the charitable tax exemption is either a payment for an
entity's ability to garner donative support6 ' or a means of compensating
charities for the risk they assume in providing public goods.'69 Each of these
economic theories for the charitable tax exemption has its strengths and its
weaknesses. In terms of explaining the economics for why charities are tax-
exempt, these traditional theories do a pretty goodjob. These theories are also
somewhat useful in sculpting the contours of the charitable tax exemption.
165. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,461 U.S. 574, 577 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19
(1938).
166. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 302-03.
167. Hansmann, supra note 3, at 55.
168. See Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status, supra note 3, passim; Hall & Colombo, Donative
Theory, supra note 3, passim.
169. See Crimm, supra note 3,passim.
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However, these traditional theories lack significant non-economic components
which, ultimately, makes them incomplete. These economic theories for the
charitable tax exemption do not explain the existence of the many non-
economic aspects of the exemption. This explanatory deficiency also means
that these efficiency theories cannot fully guide us in sculpting the contours
of charitable tax exemption law.
A. Public Benefit Subsidy Theory
The first of the efficiency based theories of charitable tax exemption is
the public benefit subsidy theory. The public benefit subsidy theory posits
that the charitable tax exemption is a means by which government encourages
organizations engaged in providing public goods to continue to do so. The
most notable proponent of this theory has been the government itself. For
example, in Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court notes
the following:
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public
benefit-a benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able
to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public institutions already
supported by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear that, to warrant
exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified in that
section and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest. The
institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as
to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred.'
In addition to the government, scholars have also advocated this public
benefit subsidy theory for the charitable tax exemption. An essential aspect
of the theory is that government subsidizes certain "goods" or services that
government either cannot or will not supply on its own. The reasons for
government failure to supply these particular goods or services vary. For
instance, government could have constitutional constraints-as is the case
with religion-that prevent government from supplying the good.
Government might also have political constraints, such as the requirement for
majority political support, that prevent it from supplying the good. Thus, the
point of the charitable tax exemption-according to the public benefit subsidy
theory-is to permit government to essentially "pay" or "compensate" private
entities that supply these public goods and services.
170. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591-92.
2006]
PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
An implicit assumption underlying the public benefit subsidy theory is the
idea that government, under neutral principles, can determine what constitutes
a public good or service.'' Hence, elements of the rational market
participant-reminiscent of economic analysis-pervade this theory of
charitable tax exemption. Also of economic dimension is the idea implicit in
the public benefit subsidy theory that the government is somehow paying
charities for what they produce.'72 Given these economic dimensions, the
traditional public benefit subsidy theory partially rationalizes many aspects of
the charitable tax exemption. That is, the exemption truly is a form of
financial support for charities-at least in some cases. Further, the
government does play a role in deciding what goods and services actually
benefit the public for purposes of the charitable tax exemption. Nevertheless,
there is much about the charitable tax exemption that the traditional subsidy
theory does not address.
For all of its great virtues, the public benefit subsidy theory does not
address why this government financial support for charities must take the form
of a tax exemption. For instance, why not simply have the government make
direct grants to nonprofit corporations that provide goods and services that
benefit the public? The public benefit subsidy theory also does not articulate
a coherent rationale for how the decision is made as to what goods and
services benefit the public. The theory's silence on this point seems to
indicate that neutral market principles might drive the process of deciding
what benefits the public. However, this is not necessarily so. In Bob Jones
University, the private university that was the subject of that case provided
what was identified in the charitable tax exemption statute as a public
benefit-education; yet the Court held that the education in that case was not
entitled to exemption due to the presence of invidious racial discrimination.'73
171. See Atkinson, Altruism, supra note 3, at 606.
172.
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based
upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds,
and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 590 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938)).
173. Justice Powell, though he agreed with the majority's ultimate holding that charities could not
maintain tax exemption if they engage in invidious racial discrimination, questioned the broad majoritarian
nature of the majority's adoption of the public policy doctrine to address this specific racial subordination
problem: "Nor am I prepared to say that petitioners, because of their racially discriminatory policies,
necessarily contribute nothing of benefit to the community. It is clear from the substantially secular
character of the curricula and degrees offered that petitioners provide educational benefits." Id. at 609
(Powell, J., concurring).
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Efficiency analysis alone, arguably, does not provide a rationalization for this
aspect of charitable tax exemption. Hence, the public benefit subsidy theory's
reliance on "neutral" efficiency principles simply does not provide a basis for
understanding how a public benefit is determined.
B. Base-Defining Theory
Recognizing deficiencies in the public benefit subsidy theory, Boris
Bittker and George Rahdert developed a theory of charitable tax exemption
that also focused explicitly on the economic aspects of the exemption. Bittker
and Rahdert' s base-defining theoryposits, essentially, that charities (and many
other nonprofits) are exempt from the federal income tax because they are not
suitable targets of the income tax. Specifically, Bittker and Rahdert state
that:
... [Charities] should be wholly exempted from income taxation, because [(1)] they do
not realize "income" in the ordinary sense of that term and because, [(2)] even if they did,
there is no satisfactory way to fit the tax rate to the ability of the beneficiaries to pay."'
Thus, according to Bittker and Rahdert, charities are exempt from the income
tax by necessity.
In support of their theory, Bittker and Rahdert explain that measuring the
income of a charity is a conceptually difficult, if not impossible, task. 7' To
begin with, measuring an entity's income requires a determination of the
entity's gross income in excess of expenses incurred in acquiring the
income.'77 Gross income is generally any economic enrichment that is not
excluded from income by Congress.' One common Congressional exclusion
from income is gifts. 79 Thus, money or property given with "detached and
disinterested generosity" is not usually treated as taxable income."' in
looking at what a charity's typical revenues might be (interest on endowment
funds, membership dues, gifts/donations), Bittker and Rahdert conclude that,
with the exception of interest on endowment funds, charities simply do not
produce revenues that represent the types of enrichments that constitute
174. See Bitker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 304.
175. Id. at 305.
176. Id. at 307-14.
177. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (defining "taxable income").
178. Id. § 61(a); Conm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1955).
179. I.R.C. § 102(a).
180. See Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
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taxable income. 8' Bittker and Rahdert explain this conclusion from two
perspectives. On the one hand, membership dues, gifts, and donations to the
charity would likely be viewed as excludable gifts from members/donors to
the charitable entity. Even if not viewed as gifts to the institution, these
charitable revenues might be viewed as excludable gifts to the charity's
beneficiaries-the charitable entity itself acting as a mere conduit for passing
the revenues to beneficiaries.
In addressing the expense side of the net income equation, Bittker and
Rahdert explain that, even if one were to properly conclude that charitable
revenues constituted gross income, a separate difficulty involves determining
what to count as deductible expenses incurred in acquiring the income. 82
Bittker and Rahdert identified charitable expenditures as potentially including
items such as staff salaries and medical welfare programs for indigents. One
way of deducting an expense is by positioning it as an "ordinary and necessary
expense incurred in carrying on a trade or business" activity.'83 Bittker and
Rahdert explain, however, that treating charitable activity as a "trade or
business" is self-contradictory because, unlike for-profit enterprises, charities
are mission-focused, not profit-focused. Additionally, even if the definition
of "business" were expanded to include the business of providing charitable
benefits, a charity would essentially end up having no tax liability because, as
a result of the non-distribution constraint, all revenues must be devoted to
mission purposes and no revenues may go as profits to insiders. Thus, net
income-save for some instances of multi-year accumulations for specific
purposes-would always equal zero, resulting in no tax liability. Anotherway
of deducting expenses is by positioning the expense as eligible for the
charitable contribution deduction.'84 However, Bittker and Rahdert explain
that, as with the business expense scenario described above, either structural
impediments in the statute authorizing the charitable deduction or the
necessary zeroing out of income that would result from allowing the deduction
indicate that charities should not be permitted to take a charitable contribution
deduction for charitable expenses.
In addition to the income measurement problems associated with
imposing an income tax on charities, Bittker and Rahdert also raise concerns
about the appropriate tax rate to apply to charities-further supporting their
181. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 307-09.
182. Id. at 309-14.
183. I.R.C. § 162(a).
184. See id. § 170(a).
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base-defining rationale for the charitable tax exemption."8 5 According to
Bittker and Rahdert, tax rates are important because they implicate
conceptions of efficiency related to either the "benefit" or "ability to pay"
theories of taxation.1 16 The idea here is that tax law generally attempts to
match tax burden with the taxpayer's circumstances. Bittker and Rahdert
argue that a charity's income should be imputed to its beneficiaries for rate
determination purposes since it is most likely the beneficiary who would bear
the burden of any tax on the charity's income. The problem, Bittker and
Rahdert explain, is that the beneficiaries are usually unknown at the time the
income is received and, thus, it is nearly impossible to determine an
appropriate income tax rate. Even if the entity were taxed as a surrogate for
the beneficiaries, Bittker and Rahdert explain that not knowing who the
beneficiaries are would necessarily mean that a tax on income would be
inefficient-potentially over-taxing some beneficiaries and under-taxing
others. Bittker and Rahdert further explain that, aside from the identification-
of-beneficiary aspect of the rate issue, another point is that these
beneficiaries-were they to receive these charitable benefits directly-would
be able to exclude them from income as excludable gifts." 7 Thus, however
the matter is approached, Bittker and Rahdert conclude that there is simply no
way of coming up with a proper tax rate if charities were to be subject to the
income tax.
As an economic explanation of the charitable tax exemption, Bittker and
Rahdert's base-defining theory does a good job of demonstrating that, for the
most part, imposing an income tax on charities would likely not yield much
in the way of federal income tax revenues. However, the thesis of this article
is premised on the notion that there is more to the charitable tax exemption
than just the elimination of a financial obligation of charities to pay tax on
income-however that term is defined.' Indeed, the charitable tax
exemption is about justice and fairness in resource allocation; it is about
providing and creating opportunities for societal enhancement and betterment
where none would exist otherwise. Thus, Bittker and Rahdert's theory, even
if taken at face value, fails to fully explain the many non-economic aspects of
the charitable tax exemption. More precisely, some of the aspects of the
charitable tax exemption that Bittker and Rahdert's theory fails to address
185. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 314-16.
186. Id. at 315 (citing R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
192-204 (1973)).
187. See I.R.C. § 102(a).
188. See supra Part III.
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include the difference between a zero or near-zero tax liability and tax
exemption,'" political activities and lobbying, 9' the definition of "charitable,"
and private foundation rules.
Throughout their base-defining theory, Bittker and Rahdert explain that,
even if the federal income tax were to apply to a charity's income, it is quite
likely that no tax revenue would result. 9' Reminiscent of this view is the
statement that "[t]ax immunity would then have been achieved, but by a more
roundabout route than the straightforward exemption.... "92 This view of the
charitable tax exemption as nothing more than elimination of a financial
obligation, completely overlooks the many other non-economic aspects of the
charitable tax exemption. As Evelyn Brody explains quite well in her
sovereignty theory of charitable tax exemption:
While most observers have described tax exemption as a subsidy, a zero rate of tax differs
qualitatively, not just quantitatively, from a one-percent rate of tax. Tax exemption
maintains an independent distance between charities and the state. Similarly, exemption
differs in an important political way from an equivalent system of direct grants.'93
Thus, in Brody's words, there is a "qualitative[]" dimension to the charitable
tax exemption that is not captured by a pure dollars and cents analysis. This
qualitative difference is what lies at the heart of the normative justification for
the exemption.
As previously explained, central to the charitable tax exemption is
defining the term "charitable."'94 Though Bittker and Rahdert address the
issue of what constitutes "charitable," they fail to fully develop the non-
economic aspects of their theory as it relates to the meaning of "charitable."'' 95
For instance, when addressing the relevance of racial discrimination to the
concept of "charitable," Bittker and Rahdert explicitly minimize the
importance of this relevance by referring to the race issue as a "minor
problem[] of interpretation."'96 Granted, Bittker and Rahdert drafted their
base-defining theory in 1976, well before the all-important Bob Jones
University case was decided in 1983.' 9" However, even in 1976 the
189. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2,at 313.
190. See id. at 305, 334.
191. See id. at 313.
192. Id.
193. Brody, supra note 3, at 592-93.
194. See supra Part 1i.
195. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 330-36.
196. Id. at 331.
197. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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predominant view was that racial discrimination rendered some purposes non-
charitable because of racial discrimination's inconsistency with federal public
policy.'98 The other "minor problem[] of interpretation" issue identified by
Bittker and Rahdert also involved an issue of paramount importance to people
of color: whether charities have an obligation to provide free or reduced cost
services to those who are unable to pay in a variety of contexts.'99 Could a
critical race perspective add to our understanding of this aspect of the
charitable tax exemption?
What's important here is that Bittker and Rahdert's base-defining theory
fails to explain this and other non-economic aspects of the term "charitable."
Instead ofrecognizing this as a limitation oftheir base-defining theory, Bittker
and Rahdert choose to minimize the non-economic issues as "minor."
Importantly, it is not only in the context of race, or even with regard to
defining charitable, that Bittker and Rahdert must account for various aspects
of the charitable tax exemption in some non-economic way. For example,
with regard to private foundations, Bittker and Rahdert's base-defining theory
could not rationalize why the various private foundation excise taxes exist.200
Thus, the architects of the base-defining theory resort to a type of contextual
diversity as a means of rationalizing these special penalty taxes. In
rationalizing the private foundation excise tax rules, Bittker and Rahdert state
that:
Private organizations displaying independence, flexibility, and originality are bound to
tread on toes, and when the toes belong to public officials, an adverse legislative reaction
should not come as a surprise.,
20
1
Rationalizing the private foundation excise taxes as a type of penalty imposed
for contravening government "territory" or "authority" seems consistent with
this article's notion of contextual diversity. That is, law and market economy
theory states that market participants are constantly seeking to gain
authoritative control in the marketplace. 0 2
198. See E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26, 30 (1976); Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971); Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
199. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 331 n.82; see also Simon, 426 U.S. at 30; Rev. Rul.
74-587,1974-2 C.B. 162 (lender to"ghetto" businesses); Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154 (public interest
law firms).
200. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 336-42.
201. Id. at 342.
202. See MALLOY, supra note 14,passim.
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Bittker and Rahdert's base-defining theory uses a similar type of non
base-defining (non-economic) analysis to fully account for the educational
exemption for museums, colleges, and orchestras."0 3  Because their
beneficiaries are not necessarily poor, as is the case with many other types of
charities, the improper rate aspect of the base-defining theory does not account
for these particular types of "educational" institutions.2 4 So, instead of
relying exclusively on base-defining/economic concepts to explain these upper
echelon charities, Bittker and Rahdert again resort to a type of contextual
diversity analysis. Accordingly, Bittker and Rahdert rationalize that the
benefits of "educational" institutions extend beyond the immediate
beneficiaries to "an indefinably wide audience over the entire income
spectrum."2 5 Additionally, they explain:
[I]t is precisely in the area of education, including the arts, that private institutions are
especially well suited to serve as independent centers of power and influence in our
society, fostering innovation and diversity with a dedication that government agencies
can seldom muster or sustain. This separate rationale for tax exemption applies
particularly to educational institutions.""0 6
Thus, when economics fails to explain some important and varied aspects of
the charitable tax exemption, Bittker and Rahdert resort to notions of
"diversity" and "context" to fill in the theoretical gaps.
C. Capital Formation Subsidy Theory
Five years after publication of Bittker and Rahdert's base-defining theory
of charitable tax exemption, Professor Henry Hansmann published his own
theory of charitable tax exemption0 7 which responds, in explicit economic
203. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 2, at 334-35.
204. Id. As Bittker and Rahdert explain:
The rationale for exempting educational institutions from income taxes is substantially the same as
that for exempting other charitableorganizations. The principal difference, which is one of degree
rather than of kind, is that the students who attend exempt schools and colleges and the patrons of
museums, galleries, and orchestras probably come from higher income classes than most of the
beneficiaries of other charitable organizations. Though this does not make it any easier to compute
the "net income" of educational organizations, it weakens one argument in favor of exempting many
other nonprofit organizations-that the burden of a tax would fall largely on persons at the bottom
of the income ladder.
Id. at 334.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 335.
207. Actually, Professor Hansmann's theory is a theory of the exemption of nonprofits generally-
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terms, °. to Bittker and Rahdert's approach. °9 In his capital formation subsidy
theory of tax exemption, Professor Hansmann explains that the rationale for
the charitable tax exemption concerns the access of charities to capital
markets. As Professor Hansmann explains:
[T]he bestjustification for the exemption is that it helps to compensate for the constraints
on capital formation that nonprofits commonly face, and that such compensation can
serve a useful purpose, at least for those classes of nonprofits that operate in industries
in which, for various reasons, nonprofit firms are likely to serve consumers better than
would profit-seeking firms.
210
Thus, for Professor Hansmann, the tax exemption compensates charities for
the lack of access to capital markets. Further, Professor Hansmann explains,
this so-called "capital subsidy" promotes "efficiency when employed in those
industries in which nonprofit firms serve consumers better than their for-profit
counterparts."21'
Central to Professor Hansmann's capital subsidy theory is the notion of
contract failure. For Professor Hansmann, contract failure is a type of market
failure that "derives from the inability of some or most consumers to make
accurate judgments concerning the quality, quantity, or price of services
provided by alternative producers."212 Contract failure, according to Professor
Hansmann, is most prevalent with what he terms donative nonprofits
(nonprofits that receive revenues mostly through donations) as opposed to
commercial nonprofits (nonprofits that receive revenues mostly through
commercial sales activities). Professor Hansmann's classic example of a
donative nonprofit that typifies contract failure is the American Red Cross.213
A person making a contribution to Red Cross is in essence buying disaster
relief services from the Red Cross for some unknown third party. This is a
circumstance of contract failure because the consumer/donor must blindly rely
on Red Cross to determine who gets disaster relief, how much they get, and
both charitable and non-charitable nonprofits. Hansmann, supra note 3, at 57 (referring to all tax
exemptions listed in I.R.C. § 501(c), not just I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). But since his theory includes the
charitable tax exemption in its scope, this article will refer to it as a theory of charitable tax exemption.
208. Id. at 56 ("Much of the discussion in this Article is presented in economic terms, as is
appropriate for the subject at hand.").
209. In fact, Professor Hansmann refers to Bittker and Rahdert's base defining theory as "[tihe most
comprehensive and thoughtful of the[] efforts" to rationalize the charitable tax exemption. Id. at 54-55.
210. Id. at 55.
211. Id. at 72.
212. Id. at 67-68.
213. Id. at 61.
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under what terms they get it. Nonprofit firms are more efficient, for Professor
Hansmann, than for-profit firms in providing these types of contract failure
services because of the nondistribution constraint. That is, consumers are not
as concerned with nonprofit firms as they would be with for-profit firms about
donations being diverted to shareholders because nonprofit firms do not have
shareholders. Thus, for Professor Hansmann, (donative) nonprofit firms are
more efficient than for-profit firms in circumstances of contract failure.
2 14
In addition to contract failure, Professor Hansmann also points to
constraints on the ability of nonprofits to obtain capital as another important
component explaining the income tax exemption. The three major sources of
funding for nonprofits are debt, donations, and retained earnings.215 Notably,
because nonprofits cannot issue shares, they do not have access to equity
capital, as is the case with for-profit firms. Professor Hansmann explains that
debt capital is difficult for nonprofits to obtain because of the risk involved in
loaning to nonprofits. Donations are also problematic because donations are
uncertain and inadequate. Thus, according to Professor Hansmann, nonprofits
must rely almost exclusively on retained earnings in order to finance growth.
While this fact alone-restraints on access to capital markets--does not
justify the tax exemption, Professor Hansmann argues that coupling this
restraint with the fact that many nonprofits operate under circumstances of
contract failure, means that the exemption is needed. For Professor
Hansmann, if we want markets to operate at optimal efficiency, and if we
accept that nonprofits are the most efficient producers of contract failure
goods/services, then it makes sense that we subsidize nonprofits in order to
increase the rate at which nonprofits can expand.2" 6
Although Professor Hansmann's capital formation subsidy theory
articulates a clear rationale for why the charitable tax exemption is efficient,
it does not articulate a clear basis for understanding aspects of the exemption
that have no necessary connection to economic efficiency. Professor
Hansmann's deficiency is most apparent in his conclusion that the tax
exemption should be sculpted so as to deny the exemption to many
commercial nonprofits that produce simple standardized services, as opposed
214. According to Professor Hansmann, two efficiency advantages of donative nonprofits include
(1) a reduction in the efforts that consumers feel impelled to make to police the provider of a service
when the provider is nonprofit rather than for-profit, [and] (2) a reduction in the disparity between
cost and price occasioned by the elimination of the excessive profits that for-profit producers might
be able to secure ....
Id. at 70 n.57.
215. Id. at 72-75.
216. Id. at 74-75.
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to complex services." 7 Typical of Professor Hansmann's view is the
statement that "[t]here would obviously be little point ... in granting the
exemption to a nonprofit hardware store.""8  What Professor Hansmann
misses here is the point that even a hardware store might provide the type of
benefit, under certain circumstances, that society wants, needs, or otherwise
values. For example, what if that hardware store only employed people who
are handicapped or blind? What if this hardware store provided an
employment opportunity to racial minority groups or others who would not
otherwise have employment? If for-profit firms choose not to open a
hardware store that employs these populations, these people might be jobless
or dependents of government. Thus, even though the hardware store might not
operate under conditions of classic contract failure, and even though it might
not be economically efficient to operate a hardware store by employing these
populations, it is still of real value to society that this hardware store operate.
To the extent that granting tax exemption allows this to happen, then society
is all the better for it.
Another example of Professor Hansmann's theory's disconnect from the
aspects of the charitable tax exemption that are not susceptible to efficiency
analysis is the assertion that nonprofit hospitals should not be eligible for tax
exemption. Professor Hansmann's articulated reason for this assertion is the
lack of contract failure or need for capital evident in the hospital industry.2 19
217. Id. at 86-89. Professor Hansmann explains:
Between these two extremes-donative nonprofits on the one hand, and commercial nonprofits that
provide simple standardized services on the other-we have the troublesome category of
commercial nonprofits that provide complex personal services such as education, hospital care,
nursing care, and day care. For which, if any, of these services are the fiduciary qualities of the
nonprofit form so effective and necessary that tax exemption can bejustified on efficiency grounds?
It is difficult to offer an authoritative answer to this question, since at present there exist little solid
data concerning the relative performance of nonprofit and for-profit firms in providing such
services.
Id. at 88.
218. Id. at 87.
219. Professor Hansmann explains:
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that there is justification for the relatively recent decision to
exempt nonprofit hospitals from taxation even if they provide no research, teaching, or subsidized
care for indigents; that is, even if they are operated as strictly commercial nonprofits. Problems of
contract failure do not seem important in the case of most hospital services. The continued
predominance of the nonprofit form in this industry seems, instead, to be attributable to historical
and financial factors largely unrelated to the relative efficiency of for-profit and nonprofit
institutions. Moreover, there is evidence that, in general, the hospital industry is already
overcapitalized. Thus, the hospital industry arguably fails both the criteria suggested above for
administering the exemption. The current policy ofexempting virtually all nonprofit hospitals may
simply further encourage what already appears to be excessive capital investment in this sector.
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It is important to realize-and this is a point that Professor Hansmann and
many others miss-that the value inherent in a particular form of charitable
organization may not be readily apparent by means of traditional efficiency
analysis. To illustrate, consider Professor Jill Horwitz's empirical research
concerning hospitals. Professor Horwitz concludes that-despite the myriad
of calls for ending tax exemption for hospitals that do not serve the poor-
empirical research shows that tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals provide societal
benefits that for-profit hospitals simply do not provide.220 The special benefits
of nonprofit, as compared to for-profit and government hospitals include the
provision of "more profitable services than government hospitals and more
unprofitable services than for-profit hospitals.""22 Though Professor Horwitz
does not conclude that these unique benefits of tax exempt nonprofit hospitals
are caused by tax exemption, she does acknowledge that this connection has
not been disproven.222 Importantly, Professor Horwitz, consistent with this
article's theory of contextual diversity, suggests that "[t]he near exclusive
Id. (emphasis added).
220. Professor Horwitz explains:
The legal categories of corporate form matter a great deaL I present new empirical work showing
that corporate form explains important differences in hospital behavior. I argue that not-for-profit
firms very likely provide public and private goods that are both in the public interest, which for-
profit firms fail to provide. By looking at only traditional measures of charitable behavior such as
subsidized care for the poor, legal scholars have overlooked distinctions among ownership types.
Instead, by examining the central function of hospitals-providing medical care-I find large
differences among corporate forms, and argue that these imply large differences in hospital goals.
Relying on this empirical work, I recommend that at least some hospitals in a market should be not-
for-profit. We do not know enough to conclude which type of hospital or mix of types in a market
is best. For the time being, we should assume that markets consisting of either entirely for-profit
or government hospitals would not serve the public interest.
Horwitz, supra note 42, at 1347.
221. Id. at 1367. Professor Horwitz explains:
This part reports and interprets new evidence that comparable hospitals ofdiffrent types-not-for-
profit, for-profit, and goverment--offer different types of medical services. The findings imply
that they implement different organizational goals. Although specifying these goals is difficult, the
evidence supports the theory that government hospitals are hospitals of last resort. They are more
likely than both other types to offer unprofitable services that are generally needed by poor,
underinsured patients. For-profits seek profits and avoid offering unprofitable services more than
the others. Not-for-profit hospitals are the intermediate type-while they are less responsive to
financial incentives than are for-profits (both in offering profitable and avoiding unprofitable
services), they are also less likely than similar government hospitals to offer unprofitable,
undersupplied services. These results belie predictions that not-for-profit hospitals will behave no
differently than for-profit hospitals in the production of public goods when under financial pressure.
Id. at 1364.
222. See id. ("Whether the tax exemption causes the differences ... remains an open question ....
[I]f the exemption is causing desirable not-for-profit behavior, then the costs of eliminating it may be
high.").
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focus on charity care as an acceptable justification for tax exemption is too
narrow. Tax policy should reflect the other important public benefits
disproportionately provided by not-for-profit hospitals."223
V. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF TAX EXEMPT
CHARITY LAW
The analysis of the charitable tax exemption contained in this article has
several very important potential implications for the structure of tax-exempt
charity law. In general, these implications center around the idea that the
parameters of tax-exempt charity law, though not endless, are at times
unknown. While we can continuously re-evaluate what does and does not
provide benefits to society and hence is entitled to tax-exempt charitable
status, we must be careful when proscribing particular functions as
categorically non-deserving of charitable status. The reason for this hesitancy
is that we simply never know what new and different value might be
produced. A new perspective on an old activity may indeed be worthwhile.
But we may never realize that value if we foreclose it categorically. This
might be problematic, in some regard, for lawmakers and judges-for they
necessarily have to draw lines and decide what is permissible and what is not.
However, it is important to always recognize that those lines are not
immoveable or static. Instead, the lines should be fluid and drawn from a
variety of perspectives.
Similarly, the analysis in this article also suggests that efficiency not be
the only guide for how tax-exempt charity law is crafted. Instead, we should
draw on lessons from LMT theory that it takes many perspectives in order to
obtain a clearer picture of the meaning ascribed to particular interpretations
of the relationship among law, markets, and culture. Thus, to the extent that
we can draw on other than positive economic visions of law to make decisions
about tax-exempt charity law, we do so to our benefit. Accordingly, we
should identify worthy and appropriate values for law and then think about the
best way to approach and implement these values in a market context. Using
this line of reasoning, it is perfectly appropriate that CRT be used as a basis
for gaining a better understanding of the public policy doctrine. The public
policy doctrine emerged from a circumstance of racial discord. However, the
policy adopted by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University is devoid of
racial components. Furthermore, no court since the Supreme Court in Bob
223. Id. at 1349.
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Jones University has applied the public policy doctrine in any circumstance
aside from racial discrimination. Given this state of affairs, contextual
diversity would suggest that the public policy doctrine be invalidated and,
instead, charities be explicitly prohibited from engaging in invidious racial
discrimination. A nuanced interpretation of this particular conclusion would
suggest that affirmative action, even if race-based, not be prohibited by this
re-cast anti-discrimination rule.
CONCLUSION
Law involves a process of interpretation, and interpretation is socially
situated. Tax law is no different. Although tax law is often represented by
quantitative analysis in terms of its impact, this should not obscure the non-
quantitative and interpretive aspects of tax law. Tax-exempt charity law, and
it allegiance to "mission" as opposed to "profit," is a perfect vehicle for
exploring the non-efficiency based aspects of tax law. This article takes part
in such analysis by articulating what is termed a "contextual diversity" theory
of the charitable tax exemption. Contextual diversity requires that various
aspects of the charitable tax exemption be examined, not only with the aim of
maximizing efficiency, but also with the broader aim of advancing
conceptions of justice that go beyond positive economic analysis to include
fairness and other ideas important to a democratic society. Thus, in addition
to using economic analysis to examine tax-exempt charity law, scholars and
others could possibly discover more diverse and different meanings in tax-
exempt charity law by drawing on appropriate non-economic legal approaches
to law, such as CRT or others. This intellectual collaboration could not only
broaden the discourse about the charitable tax exemption, it could potentially
lead to discoveries about this area of law that we never knew existed. Thus,
instead of thinking of the charitable tax exemption as simply an efficient
means of providing certain goods and services to the public, our horizons
might be broadened by thinking of the exemption in a different way. That is,
we could think of the charitable tax exemption as a means of diversifying the
market and, thus, allowing for more creative and wealth-producing
opportunities. However, the charitable tax exemption is also subject to
contextual constraints that act to limit the scope of charitable activity. In the
end, the objective should be justice, not just efficiency.
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